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Land use planning is present in virtually every state of the Union in
some form or another. Historically planning is said to have been aimed
at reducing social ills such as crowded suburbs, unsightly developments, pollution and even poverty. In this article, the authors take a
renewed look at the notion that planning is the means to solving
society's social problems. The article goes on to suggest that in many
cases land use planning may generate more social costs than it reduces.
Consequently, the remainder of the article sets forth an approach to
evaluate land use planning schemes and then examines the Oregon
planning experience using this analytical framework.

TOWARD A THEORY OF
LAND USE PLANNING:
LESSONS FROM OREGON
James L. Huffman*

Reuben C. Plantico**
In 1976, the citizens of Oregon voiced their approval of a
newly adopted statewide system of land use regulation.'
With this political victory, many believed that another
chapter of the "Oregon Story" was about to be written.
Oregon posseses a reputation of being a leader among states
in producing innovative legislation responsive to pressing
social concerns. While this characteristic has been displayed
in a variety of policy areas,' land use carries special
significance in Oregon. It is an essential element of Oregon's
image as a progressive, environmentally conscious state.'
Copyright©1979 by the University of Wyoming
*Professor and Associate Dean, Lewis and Clark Law School; Director. Natural
Resources Law Institute; B.S., Montana State University, 1967; M.A., Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, 1969; J.D., University of Chicago, 1972.
"Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Institute; B.A., Lawrence University,
1973; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978; J.D., Lewis and Clark Law
School, 1978.
1. On Nov. 2, 1976, Oregon voters rejected ballot measure 10 which called for the
repeal of Senate Bill 100: The Land Conservation and Development Act. Senate Bill
100, codified at OR. REV. STAT. 197.005 (1973), as amended, OR. REV. STAT. 664
(1977), is the enabling legislation for statewide land use planning in Oregon.
2. Examples in the environmental field include: mandatory auto emission testing, OR.
REV. STAT. 468.360-405 (1977); aerosol spray can regulation, OR. REV. STAT.
468.600-620 (1977).
3. Oregon's "progressive" reputation in the land use field grew considerably under the
administration of Governor Tom McCall. McCall's notorious proclamation to out-of-
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However, while the gradual implementation of statewide
land use planning continues in Oregon, one cannot help but
begin to wonder what defines "progressive" in the land use
area. What special problems could possibly necessitate
legislatively mandated centralized coordination of land use
regulation? For that matter, what necessitates any kind of
land use planning?
Some Oregonians would be puzzled about posing such
questions at this time. We have probably "progressed"
beyond the point where it is valuable to ask questions which
beg obvious answers. This attitude is reflected in a pair of recent law review articles by former counsel to the Oregon
Governor Edward J. Sullivan.' For Sullivan and many
Oregonians social planning is an unquestioned given and
perhaps, in part, Sullivan is correct. Perhaps without planning we may not be able to reduce the social costs which accrue from crowded suburbs, unsightly developments,
disorderly growth, congestion, the elimination of natural
amenities, pollution and poverty. But to accept as a given
that planning is the means to solving these problems, makes
that process an end in itself. To pursue planning as an end in
itself is to commit a fundamental analytical error. There are
no givens in resource allocation, and centralized land use
regulation ought not to be an accepted paradigm of twentieth century life.
It must be emphasized that this article is not a case
against land use planning in the abstract. Rather, it is an
argument against the unreasoned fascination Oregon and
other jurisdictions are currently experiencing with land use
planning.' Regardless of the standard of evaluation, land use
regulation as a means of solving our social ills must be
staters, "Come visit but don't stay," became a motto for the anti-growth environmental control campaign in Oregon. See, T. McCall, Come Visit But Don't

Stay, 46
4.
5.

STATE GOVERNMENT: THE JOURNAL OF STATE AFFAIRS,

167, 171 (1973).

Sullivan, From Kroner to Fasano: An Analysis of Judicial Review of Land Use
Regulation in Oregon, 10 Will. L.J. 358, 384-88 (1974); The Taking Issue, 5 Env. L
515 (1975).
For general discussions of the growth and variety of approaches to land use planning see, BOSSELMAN AND CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL

1971);

LINOWES AND ALLENSWORTH, THE STATES AND LAND USE CONTROL

(1975).

It is necessary, at this point, to mention that we recognize technical distinctions between planning and various kinds of implementation devices such as zoning.
See generally, HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT (1973). Traditionally planning was a non-binding process which
became binding only with the implementation of zoning ordinances. The Oregon

Supreme Court decision in Fasano v. Washington County, 246 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23
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judged against standards of performance just like any other
approach to problem solving. Absent an appropriate statement of goals and standards of performance, it is impossible
to determine if we are being progressive; if we are achieving
that which our system of land use planning and control is
designed to achieve. In this respect, Oregon has not performed well.' At this point statewide land use planning is
guided by faith rather than substance and it may result in a
system that creates more social costs than it can possibly
eliminate. There has got to be a better way. But, before trying to seek it out, it is necessary to first understand what it
is we are looking for.
The remainder of this article elaborates an approach to
evaluating land use planning and control systems and then
examines the brief Oregon statewide planning experience in
light of this analytical framework. Part One outlines the
nature of land use regulation as a problem of resource allocation. This approach is, by no means, novel,' however, it
raises fundamental issues and concepts central to a discussion of land allocation problems. Part Two describes possible
justifications for government intervention into a private
system of land allocation, and suggests a proper role for (as
well as the dangers of) public control of land use. Part Three
provides a description and related critique of the enabling
legislation for statewide land use planning in Oregon. Part
Four analyzes the confusing contributions Oregon courts
have made to that planning process. Finally, Part Five concludes with a plea for the articulation of practical; meaningful standards against which the success of our planning
efforts can be judged.
I.

THE ALLOCATION OF SCARCE LAND RESOURCES:
SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

A first and critical step toward understanding the
nature of land use planning and control is to address some

6.
7.

(1973), makes it clear that Oregon has abandoned the traditional distinction. Some
may be disturbed that we use terms like " planning" and "zoning" interchangeably
throughout the article. For our purposes, the technical distinctions are not all that
important. In Sections I-I1, we are not so concerned with the specifics of how we
wi plan and how we will apply the law of planning as we are with discussing what
planning is all about in the first place.
See parts III and IV, infra.
See, Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis For City Planning,58 COLUMN. L. REv.
650 (1958); Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REv. 293
(1969); Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminutionof Property Value as
Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REv. 779 (1976).
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rather basic issues about the business of allocating scarce
resources. "Resource allocation" refers to the process by
which we determine the purposes for and the manner in
which resources will be used. Quite simply, it is a process of
choice. The market, democracies, and administrative regulation are all, in many circumstances, merely labels for institutionalized forms of resource allocation. 8 Given the existence
of alternative processes of choice, one thing is certain: if we
do not employ one system of allocation, we will use another
or some mixture of systems. Yet, before making this initial
choice or before evaluating whatever system we have, it is
necessary to have some idea of the goals we are attempting
to achieve. For until the issue of goals is addressed, it will be
quite difficult to design any effective process of resource
allocation whether we are dealing with land, food, housing,
or, for that matter, anything at all.
In addition to clearly defining the relationship between
allocative means and ends, there is a fundamental set of factors regarding human behavior which needs to be considered. Without doubt, some will think it a bit foolish for
public decision makers to ponder the mysteries of human
behavior before making choices about the institutional form
of land use regulation. Others might think it to be clearly irrelevant. However, the manner in which individuals utilize
resources is very much a function of the kinds of incentives
they face. Of course, to a large extent, the kinds of incentives
individuals face is determined by the institutional structure
within which resource allocation decision making occurs.'
Once we understand the interrelations among human behavior, incentives and institutional structures, it will be possible to take a more intelligent approach to designing land
use control systems.
The remainder of this section examines some of these
very basic questions about resource allocation. Part A
8.

9.

Some may think it analytically irregular to mention these diverse decision making
systems all in the same breath. However, to distinguish between "economic" and
political" institutions assumes that they deal with essentially distinct problems.
The fact is, however, that they often address a single problem - the allocation of
scarce resources. Compare, BLONDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT, (1969) with DAHL AND LINDBLOM, The Isms and Social Technique, PRIVATE
WANTS AND PUBLIC NEEDS 84 (1962).
E.g., Buchanan, "Toward Analysis of Closed Behavior Systems, "THEORY OF PUBLIC

11-23 ( 1972); Randall, PropertyRights and Social Microeconomics, 15 NAT.
RES. J. 729 (1975).

CHOICE,
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develops a framework for thinking about the use of land as a
problem of choice. Part B, on the other hand, takes a position
on how to deal with the problem. It offers an approach to
land use that draws heavily on utilitarian theory and
philosophy. It explicitly rejects the notion that there exists
some objective ideal community or pattern of land uses
which need only to be discovered through the vigilent efforts
of planners (qua scientists) and the evolution of planning
techniques. Except to the extent that community welfare is
critically dependent on the maintenance of a level of environmental quality necessary to sustain basic biological
processes, the discovery of the "ideal community" is a subjective matter. 10 Given this assertion, it will be argued that
the focus of planners and planning ought to be on matters
quite different from those currently receiving attention.
A.

UnderstandingThe Problem: On Making and
Evaluating Choices

In thinking about any human activity, it seems we
should ask three fundamental questions. First, why do we do
what we do? What motivates human behavior in any particular direction? Second, by what standards can we measure
the efficacy of human activity? Thirdly, how can we and
should we structure or organize human activity in order to
attain that which we perceive as "desirable"?" No matter
what topic we are discussing, these questions are central to
every area of human activity - including land use planning.
The questions are related in that they all inquire about the
nature of human decision making and ways to judge the efficacy of decision making processes as well as specific decisions. Yet, they are indeed separate questions and must be
understood as such as they are examined throughout the remainder of this section. For now, in order to relate all of this
to land use planning, it seems we must begin by asking why,
if planning is merely another word for choosing, do we plan
at all? What gives rise to the necessity of choice?
10.

Rejection of the "objective ideal" approach to land use decision making carries
sipnificant implications for both policy analysis and policy formulation. These impications are succinctly discussed by Professor Buchanan. See, BUCHANAN, THE
LIMITS OF LIBERTY 1

11.

(1975).

It is important to note the obvious - that these questions are, in many respects, interrelated. For example, the organization of human activity would seem to require
some understanding of that which motivates human activity as well as that which
individual constituents perceive as "efficacious."
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Everybody plans. Sometimes one plans only minutes
ahead and other times one plans months or years ahead.
Whatever the time frame, the subject of human planning is
always focused on the allocation of something. It may be
land, money, time, effort, or affection. Always, the problem
is how to allocate these various things during the course of a
day, a week or a lifetime. Every individual makes choices the scope and importance of which vary significantly and unpredictably. But, virtually every human activity involves
the making of choices.
Certainly the reasons for this phenomenon are not difficult to understand. Humans have needs and wants which
they attempt to satisfy." This point really requires no
elaboration. How needs and wants develop and whether individuals should have their needs and wants satisfied are important, yet essentially separate questions. Second, the
resources required to satisfy these needs and wants are
available only in varying degrees of scarcity. It is doubtful
that one can think of many resources the consumption of
which does not reduce the amount available to other
parties."3 Even those resources once thought to be unlimited
- like air and water - are now scarce and land is another
classic example. Finally, there are two other constraints on
individuals which give rise to the necessity of choice.
Assume that resources are, in fact, available in super abundance. The individual, not having the capacity to use all
resources or unlimited quantities of them, would still have to
choose what to consume or utilize. Also, the ability of the individual to acquire that which he or she desires is limited by
the extent of his or her wealth. Individuals cannot acquire
everything they need or want because the means by which to
acquire these things is limited.
"Needs" refer to those things necessary to sustain life (water, air, food, shelter,
clothing, etc.) whereas "wants" refer to other "desires" individuals wish to fulfill.
For a traditional discussion of this topic see LEFTWICH, PRICE SYSTEM AND
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 2-4 (4th ed., 1974). Recent studies have attempted to expand
the economic treatment of consumer tastes and values. See, Stigler and Becker, De
Gustibus Non Est Disputandurn, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 76 (1977).
13. See e.g., HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS To GROWTH 19-23 (1977); B. Commoner, The Closing
Circle (1971). Of course, many resources are renewable. Also, some resources (such
as land) may be used for one purpose and then transformed or reclaimed for other
uses. On the ability of technology to mitigate certain aspects of resource scarcity
see, Ridker, To Grow or Not To Grow: That's Not the Relevant Question, 182
SCIENCE 1315 (1973).
12.
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Given the propensity of individuals to make competing
demands on scarce resources in order to satisfy their needs
and wants, what system can be employed to accommodate
this activity? What process shall be used to arrive at decisions concerning the purposes for which resources shall be
used? How will resources be transformed into those goods
and services of value to individuals? Finally, who will make
these decisions? Certainly, there are a number of familiar
systems which are employed to solve this problem. As was
mentioned earlier, the market, democratic vote, centralized
administrative planning, or even dictatorship are all
mechanisms which have been used to allocate scarce
resources. It must be pointed out that these systems of
choice can all be characterized and distinguished on the basis
of identifying who, in fact, makes the allocative decision
within each. If, as we have already asserted, much of land
use planning is a subjective matter, this fact will be of central importance to our analysis of land use planning systems.
One approach to the allocative problem is to devise a
system in which each individual makes his or her own decisions about such matters. American society has functioned
for much of its history on the basis of individuals making
choices for themselves. This is due, in part, to the fact that
some choices can only reasonably be made by individuals. It
also reflects a general philosophical preference for individual
autonomy - the liberty of individuals to preserve and pursue their own interests.14 Today, debate regarding important
resource allocation issues at times focuses exclusively on
this issue of liberty. In a sense, this is an unfortunate result
because it tends to distort the nature of the problems at
hand. Advocates of policies promotive of individual liberty
are often confronted or opposed by those who support
policies allegedly promotive of some collective goal typically
referred to as the "public interest." Perhaps no where is this
portrayed as vividly as in the area of land use. Yet, it can and
does create a fundamental distortion. Given the proper institutional legal framework, private individual activity can
14.

The history of American political philosophy is dominated by a concern for individual liberty. See, Huffman, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: CAN WE PROTECT PEOPLE WHILE PRESERVING THE ENVIRONMENT? 7 Env. Law
431, 432-440 (1977); Diamond, The Declaration and The Constitution: Liberty,
Democracy and The Founders, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH: 1976 39-55 (1976).
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generate substantial benefits for society as a whole. As a
matter of theory and practice, attainment of the "public interest" need not be exclusive of private conduct. On the
other hand, it need not be exclusive of collective decision
making either. Decentralized individual decision making and
public decision making are merely means of achieving ends.
Yet, we seldom reach this critical issue regarding the relationship between means and ends because we are so busy
squabbling about ideological issues with ideological
rhetoric.1

Today, an empirical examination of the quantity and
substantive content of our laws, if it were possible, would
probably reveal a general policy favoring increasing limitations on individual discretion. In the professed attempt to
ameliorate social costs of private activity and to secure some
level of collective welfare, the total output of regulation from
our law continues to grow. Virtually every aspect of our lives
from the production of all kinds of basic goods and services
to financial markets, our schools, health care facilities, the
condition and safety of the workplace, our modes of
transportation, availability of and entry into occupations
and other innumerable matters are touched in some way by
the hand of government regulation. All of these are examples
of a policy which argues that the scope of choices left to the
individual must be limited.
In essence, there is little to distinguish land use control
from these other sorts of regulatory activities. Land use
planning is the product of a decision of our public policy
making institutions to place limits on personal freedom of
choice. It is a statement that although people will be free to
make some choices in the allocation of their land and land
based resources, there will be certain limits. Consider the
following hypothetical case involving an individual landowner. Given what was said earlier, there are a number of
practical constraints on his ability to use his land in different
ways and to acquire more land for the purposes he intends.
Also, he may not use his land in a way that violates the
rights that others hold in adjoining land."' However, now
15.
16.

STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION, Chap. 1 (1975).
The common law of property and torts defines the relative rights of neighboring
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consider the variety of limitations imposed by law making
bodies. Our individual may have the right to build a house on
his land but not a factory, or a gas station or some other
commercial structure. 17 He may build only if the lot is of a
minimum size and the building may not exceed a specified
height.' He may or may not have the right to drain the
swamp at the far end of his lot.'9 He will probably have to
dedicate a portion of his land to the jurisdiction in which he
lives or pay a tax in lieu of as a condition for building his
house. 0 Once the house is built, regulations might even
specify the number and kinds of persons who may live
there.' These represent a mere sample of the kinds of land
use regulations which bear either directly or indirectly on the
opportunity of individuals to choose that which they desire
to do with land.
Another view of the matter will be useful. It might be
asked why it is necessary to view land use regulation as a
limit on individual choice? Why must we start with individual choice as the relevant level of analysis? Certainly
this is not required and by starting eleswhere it will be possible to reach the land use debate.
The problem which humans face at every turn is to
choose among alternative courses of action which are
available to them. The choice mechanism based upon individual decision making is presented above because it
seems central to the American scheme of things. Another
mechanism for human choice, and one which is also central
to the American scheme of things is democratic choice.22
Society can vote by some means and thereby make choices
on just about anything. The complexities of this approach
are numerous. There are an abundance of different apportionment schemes for taking the vote.2 ' Each will in some
landowners. For a general discussion of this structure of rights and its allocative
significance see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, §§ 3.4-3.7 (2nd ed. 1977).
17. See, ANDERSON. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, Chapter 9 (1976).
18. See, FREILICH AND LEVI, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS, § 4.2(2) (1975).
19. See, Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7. 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972); Sibson v. State,
115 NH 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975).
20. See, Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 633, 94 CaL Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606, appeal dismissed 404 U.S. 878 (1971);
Jordon v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608 (1966).
21. Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
22.

See U.S. Const., ART. I, § 2(1), ART. IV, § 4.

23. See, Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S. 533 (1964). For relevant discussions of the theories
of voting and representation in democratic systems see, Auerbach, The Reappor-
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way reflect certain basic values of the ruling members of
society. Many democratic choices will be very difficult to impose upon individuals, a factor which discourages the
democratic regulation of many types of choices and which,
perhaps more importantly, suggests something about
human nature. Individuals will, if they do not like the
democratic choice, and if they can get away with it at a
justifiable price or risk, frequently refuse to comply with
democratic choices. The explanation for such behavior is central to the theory of human conduct which lies at the heart of
the choice theory discussed in the second part of this section.
The debate about land use like the debate about
resource allocation problems generally has failed to join the
critical issues. Land use analysis in our policy making
forums seems to look exclusively to either the problem of
means or to the problem of the ends. The critical relationship
between the process of making allocative decisions and ends
has not been well perceived or examined. Again, it seems
necessary to go back to the very basic questions raised in
this part. Much of the remainder of this article argues for a
specific approach to the land use problem. Whether the approach is better or worse from a social point of view is not for
us to say."' We hope it is better in the sense that it attempts
to establish the relationship between allocative means and
ends. Also, the approach to decision making offered here is
based on a theory of human behavior. It would seem apparent that understanding something about human behavior
is central to the success or failure of any system which attempts to organize human activity.
B.

One Approach: The UtilitarianAlternative

Neoclassical economic theory, which has made perhaps
the only significant step toward formulating a theory of
human welfare based upon our understanding of individual
behavior and the relationships among individuals with
24.

tionment Cases: One Person, One Vote - One Vote, One Value, SuP. CT. REv. (1964);
Buchanan and Tullock, supra Note 1, Part 11; and Mueller, Public Choice: A
Survey, 14 J. ECON. LiT. 395 (1976).
Although the remainder of section I and section II argue for an approach that is
allegedly more efficient, we cannot conclude that it is "better". For example, an efficient allocation of resources takes as given a corresponding distribution of wealth. If
society finds that distribution repugnant to its values, efficiency may be only a
necessary and not a sufficient condition of a good society. See also, R. Posner, Supra
note 17, at §§ 1.2, 2.2.
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respect to things we would regard as being "economic","
provides an analytical framework within which to evaluate
land use problems. The power of the theory lies partly in the
fact that it is predicated upon several fundamental tenets
about the human experience. First, it recognizes that the
necessity of human choice - which has been referred to
throughout this article - is the product of essentially those
factors discussed in Part A of this section, namely the desire
to fulfill wants and needs in the face of resource scarcity.
The remaining tenet of the theory is a behavioral one.
The utilitarian theory of human behavior underlies the approach to land use planning which is articulated in the remainder of this article. But, a word of caution is necessary
here. There is no uniform agreement on the meaning of
utilitarianism. The utilitarian theory, which has been frequently maligned and more frequently misunderstood, is a
"positive" statement about human behavior.16 It asserts
simply that people will act to maximize their pleasures and
minimize their pains.2" People, in other words, are motivated
by self interest.
It is typically asserted that utilitarian theory is effectively refuted by evidence of people's constant willingness to
do things for others. People save lives at great risk, they give
gifts at great expense and perform a variety of other
altruistic deeds. Why do people do these apparently selfless
things? It is because of the values they hold. For example, if
one values human life, it will be important to protect it and
its protection will bring pleasure to the person holding that
value.28
The theory defines rigorously the conditions necessary for individuals to maximize
personal welfare in a social context. The ability to achieve optimum social welfare
through collective decision making is severely circumscribed by the impossibility of
making interpersonal comparisons of utility. This was formally demonstrated by
the classic work of ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2nd ed., 1963).
26. John Stuart Mill displayed his frustration over misuse of the term "utilitarian" in
the following passage: "Yet the common herd, including the herd of writers, not only
in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetualright
ly falling into this shallow mistake. [The assumption that utility is a test of while
and wrong as opposed to pleasure.] Having caught up the word 'utilitarian'
knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the
rejection or the neglect of pleasure in some of its forms:
of beauty, of ornament, or of
889 4Modern
Library Ed., 1939).
UTILITARIANISM,
27. amusement."
BENTHAM, AN MILL,
INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS
25.

AND LEGISLATION, Chap.
1 (1789). Utilitarianism has been most frequently employed as a science or theory of

ethics rather than behavior. See, LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS,
Chap. I (2nd ed. 1957). Our focus is primarily behavioral and, therefore, we
28.

"sidestep" for now the normative principles alleged to be embodied in utilitarian
theory.
The self-interest axiom has been a source of disconcertion for many. The most com-
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If we disagree with the choices that others make, it is
fruitless to criticize the choice as being wrong or illconsidered. What we are really questioning are the values
which led to the particular choice.2 9 The significance of this
point cannot be overemphasized, for invariably in the
political arena of land use planning can be heard accusations
about selfish considerations by people who act only out of
self interest. The truth is that everybody attempts to act in
their self interest. What makes people prefer different alternatives are the values which they hold. The point of attack if
change is sought should not be a frontal one on the choice
made, rather it should be an effort to persuade others to
adopt the values which will lead to the preferred result.30
When applied to land use, this theory of human conduct
says that people will choose to do with their land based
resources that which they believe will bring them the most
net benefit (benefits minus costs). The values one holds serve
to define what are costs and what are benefits. A cost to one
person may be a benefit to someone else. 1
Recognizing the problem of resource scarcity and the
self-interested behavior of individuals, an appropriate goal
mon error has been to confuse self-interest with "selfishness" and therefore condemn self-interest as a form of behavior. For example, see, MONTAGU, ON BEING
HUMAN, 20-21 (Rev. ed., 1966). However, there is a subtly different criticism of the
utilitarian/self-interest approach. Some attack utilitarianism because of its
homocentric perspective; its focus on the fulfillment of human wants. See, Tribe,
Was Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New FoundationsforEnvironmentalLaw,
83aALE
L.J. 1315, 1324, 1348 (1974).
29. Consider the following example: If I enjoy woodworking or sitting by my fireplace,
it will bring me satisfaction to go into my backyard and cut down trees to use as
firewood or to make a table. But assume that I also derive satisfaction from making
my wife or my neighbor happy. Assume further that they derive pleasure from the
trees as they are in my backyard. I may choose to forgo the pleasure derived from
the use of my trees for woodworking or for fuel in order to please my wife or my
neighbor. But it will not have been anything but a self-interested choice. It will mean
simply that I derive more pleasure from making my wife or my neighbor happy. If
one does not approve of my cutting down trees, it is useless to disapprove of my selfinterested behavior. What one is really objecting to are the values which led me to
prefer one course of action over another. In a recent article, Jack Hirshleifer suggests that altruistic behavior in no way contradicts the self-interest axiom. In fact,
altruism may well be a behavioral trait that becomes biologically sustained because
it ultimately tends to promote survival - a rather fundamental human "interest".
See, Hirshleifer, Economics From A Biological Viewpoint, 20 J. LAW AND ECON. 1,
17-26 (1977).
30. For example, rather than criticizing a neighbor for cutting down a beautiful tree, an
approach which may lead him to cut down another tree, one should attempt to persuade the neighbor of the beauty of trees. There are numerous methods of persuasion - short of coercion - which might achieve this end. Some find this approach
unappealing in that the justification for saving trees is only that it satisfies a human
want. Why should not trees be preserved for their own sake? See discussion at note
29 supra.
31. For an argument that every individual choice has costs for others see Samuels, An
Economic Perspective on the Compensation Problem, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 113 (1974).
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would be to design an institutional structure within which
individuals attempt to maximize their personal welfare yet,
in so doing, precipitate benefits to society in general."2 Given
certain ideal conditions,3 voluntary exchange among individuals in market settings will lead to an efficient allocation of scarce resources. But, what does it mean to achieve
efficiency? Efficiency means simply that consumer demands
are being effectively satisfied at the lowest possible cost to
society. Markets provide individuals the opportunity to exercise direct choice over a variety of goods and services. Individuals, through their dollar votes, provide the relevant information about what should be supplied and in what
amounts. a4 Efficiency means also that resources are
gravitating to their most highly valued uses (measured by
consumer willingness to pay) through the exchange medium.
When no further exchanges could be made which leave at
least one person better off without making anyone else worse
off, then we have attained optimum efficiency - known also
as Pareto Optimality.35
Standard optimization models describe in detail the conditions necessary for efficient resource allocation through
voluntary market exchange.3 6 Central to this entire process
is the critical role of the price system in reflecting the costs
of using specific resources for specific purposes.37 These
32. This, of course, was the basic purpose of ADAM SMITHS' AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
33. These conditions include: (i) absence of monopoly in product and factor markets, (ii)
perfect information, (iii) a general absence of market failure of which externalities
and public goods are symptomatic. For succinct discussions see, HAVEMAN, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 23-27 (1970); HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS, 446-458 (1976).
34. Haveman describes the ideal result: "With a smoothly functioning market system,
the complete pattern of consumer preferences is captured in the demands which are
expressed in the market. Likewise, the costs to society of satisfying these
preferences are embodied in the supply curves. Consequently, when the market
reconciles demands and supplies, it enables everything which is produced to yield
benefits to buyers (as reflected in their willingness to pay) which exceed the costs of
getting it produced." Haveman, supra note 34, at p. 28. A useful discussion of the
relationship between resource allocation and wealth distribution is contained in
Weisbrod, Collective Action and the Distribution of Income: A Conceptual Approach, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 117, 120 11970).
35. For an excellent discussion of the Pareto Criterion and its essential relationship to
the elements of economic efficiency [i.e., Consumer sovereignty, efficiency in production, and efficiency in the distribution of the product] see, DORFMAN, PRICES AND
MARKETS, 174-195 (2nd ed., 1972).
36. See, e.g., Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. ECON. REV.
22 (1957).
37. Prices play two related yet separate roles in the economy. First, assuming competitive conditions where price equals the actual cost to society of producing one additional unit of output (marginal cost), prices provide critical incentives which encourage efficient behavior by consumers and producers. Second, prices provide an
extensive information network regarding the relative scarcities of resources, the
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models have been developed in detail elsewhere and there is
no need to engage in a technical description here. However, it
is important to examine briefly the control function played
by the legal system in promoting efficient resource allocation through market decision making.
Advocates of land use regulation submit that such controls are a necessary response to the costs generated by
private activity. They tend to ignore the fact that there exists a basic legal structure (imperfect in some respects yet
subject to improvement) which developed in an earlier time
for any of the same reasons which are advanced to justify
contemporary public regulation."' The common law of property, torts (which in itself is merely a species of property law)
and contract evolved as the rules of the marketplace. They
comprise a structure of privately enforced rights which have
the effect of promoting efficient economic use in market settings. 9 For example, market transactions actually involve
the exchange or transfer of ownership rights. Land transactions, therefore, involve the exchange of specific property
rights which attach to the use of that land. Contract law promotes efficiency by facilitating the exchange of such ownership rights and by protecting the parties involved in exchange agreements.40 The law of nuisance and trespass (normally subjects of tort law) illustrate the point that ownership rights are never exclusive. Such rules can ensure in
many cases that one landowner cannot use his land in a way
that systematically imposes costs on others. Quite simply,
nuisance and trespass rules can provide mechanisms to internalize the costs of private activity.41
supplies of outputs, the availability and costs of substitutes, and the relative value
of outputs to consumers. For an argument that no other known mechanism provides
such information so extensively and efficiently see, Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945); and HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 49-50
(1944).
38. See, e.g., Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. EcoN. Assoc.
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 347 (1967); Anderson and Hill, The Evolution of Property
Rights:A Study of the American West, 18 J. LAW AND ECON. 163 (1975) arguing that
property rights evolved to internalize costs of private economy.
39. Posner, supra note 16, at 27-191; Furubotn and Pejovich, Property Rights and
Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. EcoN. LIT. 1137; Cheung,
The Structure of Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J. LAW
AND ECON. 49 (1970).

40.
41.

Posner, supra note 16, at § 4.1.
Many assert, as an automatic justification for government regulation, that constitutional protections of private rights have never recognized that individuals may do
anything with their land. See, BOSSELMAN, THE TAKING ISSUE 1 (1973). This fact,
however true, provides no analytical basis for public regulation of land as property.
Private rights in land are mutual. The common law of nuisance and trespass repre-
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In the context of land use, it has been demonstrated
that this self regulatory mechanism of the marketplace is by
no means beyond practical implementation.42 Careful consideration of those factors which contribute to an efficient
system of private rights, something which has been discussed at length by property rights scholars in many contexts, presents a viable yet largely unaccepted approach to
land use policy problems.43 In those situations where decentralized decision making through markets can operate with
tolerable efficiency, it is very difficult to justify substituting
public for private allocation systems. The role of government
ought to be restricted to the task of enforcing private rights.
The above discussion does not deny a necessary and
proper role for government in the land use area. Our position
merely suggests that intervention ought to occur only when
markets are unable to allocate resources efficiently."
However, an additional word of caution is necessary at this
point. Providing a justification for government intervention
and specifying the precise form of intervention are two
separate tasks. The latter is far more difficult to describe at
a conceptual level and equally difficult to implement on a
practical level.4 5 The little empirical work that has been per-

formed in this area indicates that the results of intervention
have been mixed. 46 However, the first step to successful in-

tervention is the matter of establishing goals and standards
of performance.
In a society such as ours, where private resource allocation has played a vital role and public allocation, through
methods like land use planning, operates as a limit on
private choice, there are two basic issues which arise in
42.
43.
44.
45.

sent privately enforced limitations or regulations on uses of land. The only relevant
question is when are private limitations inadequate so as to justify public ones.
ee, Ellickson, Alternatives To Zoning, supra note 7; Siegan, Non-Zoning in
Houston, 13 J. LAW AND ECON. 71 (1970); Roberts, Alternatives To Zoning, 28 LAND
USE AND ZONING DIGEST 5 1976).
See e.g., Symposium, NaturalResource Property Rights, 15 NAT. RES. J. 639-797
(1975).
See discussion in Section II, infra.
See, TuUock, The Social Costs of Reducing Social Costs, MANAGING THE COMMONS,
147-156 (1977); McKean, Divergences Between Individual and Total Costs Within
Government 58 AM. ECON. REv. 243 (1964).

46. See, e.g., Maser, et. al, The Effects of Zoning and Externalitieson the Priceof Lan&Some Empirical Results and Their Implications for Municipal Zoning, 10 J. LAW
EcoN. 79 (1967); Reuter, Externalities in Urban Property Markets: An Empirical
Test of the Zoning Ordinanceof Pittsburgh,16 J. LAW AND ECON. 313 (1973); Ervin
et. al. supra note 7, at 61-102. For a non-empirical study see, SIEGAN, OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY (1976).
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assessing a land use regulation system. First, it is necesary
to settle upon an allocative standard. Second, it is necessary
to identify the allocative mechanism which best satisfies
that standard. The utilitarian allocative model articulated
above provides the basis of a workable standard. Any
allocative system can be judged against the utilitarian
allocative standard. Private allocation through a market
place is one possible system. Another is democracy. A third
might be some form of central administrative planning. Of
these and other alternative allocative mechanisms the
market provides the most effective means of integrating
private wants and assuring that each individual is able to optimize his welfare, given the scarcity of resources and the existing distribution of wealth. It is also the most efficient
system because it accurately reflects the costs of resource
utilization. The defenses of free market allocation of
resources are numerous, and most challenges to that alternative are based upon identified failures of the market to
achieve its theoretical goals. This market failure appears to
be the motivating factor for the imposition of land use planning in Oregon. If this is true, land use planning ought to be
designed to correct or compensate for the failure of the
market to allocate resources efficiently.

II.

THE COST INTERNALIZATION: CASE FOR LAND USE
REGULATION

It has been argued that several virtues can be
associated with the process of allocating scarce resources by
private exchange in market settings. Assuming the legal
system efficiently provides an appropriate degree of certainty and security both in personal safety and the ownership
and exchange of resources, the market takes advantage of
important incentives which tend to encourage individuals to
pursue socially beneficial activities. Basically, it provides
the means for individuals or groups of individuals to make
themselves better off while providing goods and services for
others.4 7
47.

Now it may seem that we are being untrue to our earlier proposition that processes
should not become ends in themselves. Just as land use planning should not become
an end in itself, neither should the market. Therefore, it must be emphasized that we
are not advocates of the market as such. Rather, we are looking for the best means
to maximize welfare. To the extent the market achieves that end, then it is the appropriate means. To the extent planning achieves it. then planning is appropriate.
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Regulation reflects a conclusion that this private
system does not result in a socially optimum allocation of
resurces. This conclusion is typically based on the notion
that the summation of costs and benefits which accrue to
specific individuals who participate in market transactions
diverge from those which accrue to society as a whole.
Because there are social costs which result from private decisions, it is necessary to correct for such socially injurious
private choice by placing limits on the freedom of the individuals to choose. Therefore, in order to attain efficient
resource allocation, we must turn to our public decision making institutions to plan and organize economic activity in
various markets.
The purpose of this section is to discuss those issues
relevant to a determination of a proper role for the state in
securing a level of welfare through land allocation that is not
obtainable in the market-place. Because the issues are
diverse and complex, they will be examined in three parts.
Part A engages in a brief digression on the business of choosing goals which guide our resource allocation efforts. Part B
presents an analytical framework for identifying causes of
market failure, which, in turn, provide a necessary (although
not sufficient) justification for government intervention in
the form of public land use control. Finally, Part C discusses
a variety of obstacles to attaining efficient resource allocation through public land use planning. It also addresses the
far more serious problem of how public agencies themselves
generate social costs.
A.

Choosing Among Worthy Goals: A Digression

To this point, our concern has been almost exclusively
with the matter of allocative efficiency. However, this is not
to deny that there exist other goals upon which public land
use control might be predicated. Certainly, if no one cared
about efficiency, there might be little reason to discuss it. So
implicitly our position assumes that efficiency is very important indeed. 8 Yet there is evidence both within the academic
community and the content of "public opinion" that several
other goals are, or at least should be, on our minds. The truth
48.

Yet, even if no one admitted the importance of efficiency, our utilitarian theory of
behavior - if accurate - would compel us to deal with efficiency at some point.
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of this assertion does not in any way limit the validity of a
major thesis of this article - that the means of allocation
must be designed with the relevant goals in mind. The very
critical problem at every turn is to know something about
one's destination before setting out on the journey.
1. DistributiveJustice
Nearly every major discourse on public sector decision
making suggests that furthering the end of economic justice
is a proper function of the state."9 In fact there is probably no
greater force at work today in our policy making forums
than the demand that government either (a) effectuate a
more even distribution of wealth; or (b) eliminate causes of
unequal access to the means of satisfying individual wants
and needs.50 There are some fundamental problems in
evaluating the efficacy of policies designed to promote these
distributive ends. While for matters of resource allocation,
economists can base policy prescriptions on a technical
theory of value and efficiency, no equivalent policy guidance
exists for issues of wealth distribution. As one commentator
in the land use field explains,
Because they have found no theoretically sound
basis for making interpersonal comparisons of utility, many economists believe they can at best only
describe the wealth transfer effects of a policy, but
they cannot assess the fairness of those transfers
...the degree of unfairness of a system cannot be
quantified and persuasive arguments about fairness
are hard to construct.51
It is, for all practical purposes, a question of values or
philosophical preference as to what constitutes a "just"
distribution of wealth and opportunity among members of
society. Recently, a few seminal works have provided
valuable perspectives from which to view this problem.52 It
seems, however, none have yet received the acceptance
necessary to qualify them as paradigms for policy analysis
on questions of distributive justice. 3
49.

See, for example, MUSGRAVE,

50.

THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959); Herber,
MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE: THE STUDY OF PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS (Rev. ed., 1971).
NISBET, THE TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 198-223 11975).

51.

Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 7 at 690.

52.

RAWLS, A

53.

However, for the proposition that a Rawlsian policy of "minimum needs" (i.e., "That

THEORY OF JUSTICE

(1971); Wolff,

UNDERSTANDING
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This analytical dilemma may pose difficulties in the land
use area. Land has been such a constant source of wealth
that it is only natural for it to be the focus of intense
distributional conflict. Regardless, there is no sound
54
justification for confusing land use policy means and ends.
Redistributive goals ought to be realized through policies
designed to promote redistribution. Unfortunately much
land use regulation is replete with conflicting means and
ends. If the purpose of government intervention is the
elimination or mitigation of the costs which some uses of
land impose on neighboring land owners, then it seems likely
that efficiency is our goal. Several policies designed to address that problem might be implemented. However, there
are numerous land use controls which purport to achieve efficiency, yet have primarily a redistributive impact. The result
can be only costly confusion.
Consider a local zoning plan which, in the eyes of its
designers, reflects the ideal pattern of land uses in that community. The plan will most likely consist of regulations
which preclude uses of land once recognized as valid in certain locations. This is the point at which a very difficult issue
arises. If, in fact, the zoning plan has little to do with
separating incompatible land uses, but actually redefines
rights merely because the altered pattern satisfies the planning commission's vision of a more perfect community, then
the real impact is redistribution. Rights to use land have
been effectively transferred from one party to the state or,
perhaps, to neighboring land owners. Yet, it is the former
holders of those rights who bear the full cost of the
transfer. 5
Compare the above situation with another case of intervention where the relationship between distributive
means and ends is both perceived and realized. Two major
basic material needs be guaranteed by the government to those who cannot satisfy
them through their own efforts") is becoming solidly entrenched in ourpolitical life
see, Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive
Justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1976).
54. Although there are certainly strong motives - perhaps surreptitious ones - for individuatls to seek redistribution through government. See North, PoliticalEconomy
and EnvironmentalPolicies, 7 ENV. L. 449, 456-458 (1977).
55. Unless, of course, compensation is required under the "Taking Clause": U.S. Const.,
Amend. V. To obtain "just compensation," an actual physical seizure of property is
not required. Regulation affecting property may require the payment of just compensation. See generally, STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DoMAIN (1977).
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problems faced by planners are the preservation of and accessibility to natural amenity resources. Oregon provides a
classic example. The Oregon Coast is one of the natural
wonders in the United States offering both scenic and recreational benefits. In 1967, the Oregon legislature, taking notice
of the increasing demands being placed on coastal resources,
the scarcity of ocean front property and the naturally increasing interest of private entities in gaining ownership of
that property, enacted ORS 390.610:
(1) The Legislative Assembly hereby declares it is
the public policy of the State of Oregon to forever
preserve and maintain the sovereignty of the State
heretofore existing over the seashore and ocean
beaches of the state from the Columbia River on the
North to the Oregon-California line of the South so
that public may have the free and uninterrupted use
thereof.
This statute, in effect, secured for every person the right of
access to the Oregon Ocean Beaches. No doubt, as an alternative, these beaches could be held in private ownership as
beaches in other parts of the country are. This would have effectively excluded individuals unable to buy access to beach
land. 6 The end furthered is, obviously, the even distribution
of access to an amenity resource.
Evaluating the efficacy of policies designed to achieve
distributive ends or of policies with incidental yet significant
redistributive impacts is beyond the scope of this article.
However, some basic observations are in order. Policies having redistributive impacts are not costless. The costs may
take a variety of forms, but we are primarily concerned with
those costs accruing to individuals as a result of regulations
affecting their land. As in the first example presented above,
owners of rights in the use of land who are suddenly
regulated in an adverse way by land use planning laws may
incur substantial losses. Land investments are costly and
usually, such investments are made with the expectation of
reaping some benefit. If in this process, one landowner imposes costs on neighboring landowners, a policy promoting
efficiency would, in many cases, force those costs to be in56.

See, e.g., Wolff, War On The Beaches, 4 REAL EST. REV. No. 2, 82-84 (1974).
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ternalized. However, if a right to use land in a certain way is
suddenly wiped out or transferred by regulation, there are
strong arguments for compensating the landowners. First, a
matter of fairness, it seems difficult to justify having the
landowner bear the full cost of a right transfer that benefits
the state or neighboring landowners. 7 Second, uncompensated redistributions via regulation can have inefficient effects. They create a very uncertain climate for private activity. If there exists a substantial risk of loss due to noncompensatory regulation, individuals will be faced with
disincentives to engage in more highly valued uses of land."
In addition, those who actually gain or stand to gain from
noncompensatory regulation (i.e. those who receive benefits
without bearing any costs) are faced with incentives to direct
resources into influencing the regulatory process."
Although this use of resources may result in benefits to
those influencing the process, it is likely that significant opportunity costs arise from the use of resources in this fashion
as well as generating more misallocation due to uncertainty
in the land market.60
2.

Environmental Goals: Maintaining the Delicate Balance

Environmental science, though still in a nascent stage
of development, has produced much information regarding
the nature and maintenance of relationships within natural
systems. Central to our scientific understanding of ecology
is the notion that there exists some equilibrium or steady
state in all natural systems. To upset this equilibrium may
57.

See, Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:Comments On The Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1218-24, 1250-51 (1967): arguing

against blatently capricious "takings" or those which bring about "nearly total
destruction of some previously crystallized value"; and Berger, A PolicyAnalysis of
The Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 195-97, 210-213 (1974): arguing for a

58.

compensation principle that protects "reasonable expectations" of private parties
as a matter of fairness.
The behavioral effects of noncompensatory regulation are, of course, empirical questions. However, economic theory would suggest that fear of uncompensated regulation might create insecurity and, therefore, prevent individuals from putting their
land to more highly valued uses. For a related discussion see, Michelman, Id at
1208-1218; and Williamson, Administrative Decision Making and Pricing:Externality and CompensationAnalysis Applied, THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTPUT 115,

119-129 (1970). The results of such redistributive policies may in fact be less wealth
for everyone. By deterring productive activity, the amount of wealth available for
actual redistributive purposes would not increase. Cf, Hagman, The Vesting Issue.
The Rights of Fetal Development vis a vis The Abortions ofiPublic Whimsy, 7 ENV.
L. 519, 520, 527 (1977).

59.
60.

Cf., Ervin et al., supra note 7, at 21.
Seldom recognized is the fact that resources diverted from other activities for the
purpose of obtaining inefficient regulation represents a distinct kind of opportunity
cost. Cf, Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Its Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN.

807, 809 (1975).
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endanger the perpetuation of vital life cycles. In a recent
paper, Professor Barry Commoner suggested several ways
in which the delicate balance of natural processes might be
upset.6 1 First, constituents of the ecosystem which have
economic value can be withdrawn from the exosphere. Excessive exploitation of any given constituent may have
deleterious effects.62 Second, a component of the ecosystem
may be added above its proper level by external sources.'
Finally, an ecosystem might be damaged by the introduction
of substances wholly foreign to it and the resulting stress
may lead to the destruction of the system. 4 The critical
problem in each instance is to monitor these natural systems
in order to detect imbalances which could have serious environmental impacts.
Several approaches to the problem of detecting
ecological imbalances have been developed at least at the
conceptual level. Theories of environmental "carrying
capacity" 5 and "materials balance ' 6 6 have become familiar
to many in the field. Another approach which has significant
potential is energetic analysis.6 7 Energetics is predicated on
the idea that the maintenance of life support systems relies
on the availability of usable energy. Therefore, our ability to
understand the relationship between human activities and
their impacts on energy flows could provide critical information about the preservation of ecological sytems6 8
What has this to do with land use planning? If one accepts the idea that energy is the key to understanding the
capacity of natural systems to support human activities, an
energy valuation system might provide the proper -tool for
analyzing and formulating land use policies. Energy accoun61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.

Commoner, The Environmental Costs of Economic Growth, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 331, 335-36 (2nd ed., 1977).
I.e., over exploitation of agricultural or timber lands, and fisheries, Id. at 335.
Le., intrusion of sewage into surface water or the intensive use of fertilizer, Id at
335.
I.e., infusion of DDT upsetting the balance among insect pests, plants and insect
prey, Id. at 335.
See, e.g., WATT, PRINCIPLES Oil ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 25 (1973); Pope, Communities and Environments: Carrying Capacity, EQUILIBRIUM 12 (Jan. 1973).
Kneese et. al, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MATERIALS BALANCE APPROACH
(1970).
See, e.g., ODUM & ODUM, ENERGY BASIS FoR MAN AND NATURE (1976); ODUM,
ENVIRONMENT POWER AND SOCIETY (1971).

68. Id at 1.
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ting systems employing such analysis are being developed
69
as practical instruments of land use allocation.
There are likely to be goals in addition to the two
discussed here that society is interested in achieving.70 No
matter which goals we choose to guide our land use system,
they need to be operationally defined so that the appropriate
means of satisfying those goals might be developed. It is not
unreasonable to suggest, however, that the utilitarian
theory of resource allocation might also accommodate some
of these other goals as well. For example, it is quite possible
that individuals, when faced with complete information
about the effects of land use decisions on environmental processes and the costs of those decisions, would make
allocatively as well as energetically efficient decisions. Of
course, the critical problems are to generate sufficient information and to ensure that individuals are faced with true
cost of any given land use decision. 7'
To conclude this inquiry about goals, some comments
concerning the Oregon approach to defining goals are relevant here. Section IV of this article analyzes in some detail
the goals and guidelines promulgated by the Oregon Land
Conservation and Development Commission. There are nineteen goals in all and their successful implementation would
seem to require more than the work of mere mortals as they
are indeed noble goals. The problem is that they are too
numerous and too broad to be meaningful standards for land
use planning. For example, blanket statements are made
about preserving agricultural lands,72 coastal resources,73
forest lands, 4 and open spaces;"i providing for housing and
69.

See, e.g., Nilsson, Energy Analysis - A More Sensitive Instrument for Determining
Costs of Goods and Services, 3 AMBIo 222 (1974); Hannon, An Energy Standardof
Value, 410 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. Sci. 139 (1973); Klystra, Carrying Capacity Project for Floridaand Its Major Regions Involving NaturalSystems
Inventory and Comprehensive Planning (Carrying Capacity Comm. Fla. Legis.,

1974); and Office of Energy Research and Planning, Office of the Governor, State of
Oregon, Energy Study: Interim Report July 26, 1974).
70. For example. preserving options for future generations or advancing a goal based on
some notion of ecological justice. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 27; STONE, SHOULD
TREES HAVE STANDING? (1974); Sagoff, supra note 27.
71.

Huffman and Fleming, Alocative and Energetic Implications of Land Use Planning, 5 ENV. L. 477, 510-512 (1975); cf, Gordon Economics and The Conservation

Question, 1 J. LAW ANn ECON. 110 (1958).
72. LCDC Goals and Guidelines, No. 3.
73. Id. at No. 5 17-19.
74.

Id. at No. 4.

75.

Id. at No. 5.
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transportation needs;76 and insuring orderly transition from
urban to rural lands.77 Decisions about land use are seldom,
if ever, all or nothing propositions. To the extent the Oregon
goals appear to be just that, they provide no direction for
decision making whatsoever. Land use decisions, like all
allocative decisions are made "at the margin". 78 Is it too obvious to ask for standards as to how much agricultural land
we should preserve at the cost of foregoing other benefits?
Or what standards guide our decisions about the quality and
quantity of transition from urban to rural lands?
The benefit of looking to the utilitarian allocative theory
is that it leads us to ask fundamental questions about the
specific substantive ends individuals want to pursue. It
assumes nothing about that which individuals view as
desirable. Rather, its implicit focus is on process problems of
aggregating individual preferences and translating them into social policy. The Oregon goals, on the other hand, do
make some absolute assumptions about "good" land use.
Yet, even those assumptions are stated in a way that affords
little decision making guidance.
B. Market Failure and Allocative Inefficiency: A Basis
for Government Action
Although one can identify numerous markets through
which a variety of resources are allocated, there are times
when markets are prevented from forming. In an ideal setting where markets arise spontaneously to allocate all
resources, the costs and benefits which accrue to the parties
of any specific exchange are no more nor less than the costs
and benefits which accrue to society as a whole. The total
social cost of the transaction or activity is reflected in the
prices of the resources exchanged and the goods and services
produced from those resources.7 9 The allocative significance
76. Id, at No. 10 and No. 12.
77. Id. at No. 14.
78. It would do well for land use policy makers to consider the following statement
about the concept of marginality:... "intelligent men often ignore it in the discussion of public issues. Educators, for example, often suggest that if it is better to be
literate than illiterate, there is no logical stopping point in supporting education...
The correct comparison of course, is between additionalbenefits created bv the Droosed activity and the additional costs incurred." Ruff, The Economic Common
ense of Pollution, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, No. 19, 69 at 70-71 (Spring, 1970).
79. Social cost is the entire cost to society of any particular transaction. See generally,
Coase, The Problem of Social CosA 3 J. LAW AND ECON. 1 (1960). In reality, "social
cost" is a misnomer because costs are relevant only insofar as they are experienced
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of this alignment of private and social cost is that individuals are faced with appropriate incentives which affect
behavior. When faced with the total cost of their actions, individuals will be able to make efficient decisions both from
their own point of view and society's.
Where the price of land reflects the true marginal cost of
the use of land, and that price is known or knowable by
private parties, it provides information about the feasibility
of various activities on that piece of land and about the appropriate level of intensity at which the land may be used.80
However, where markets are unable to form, price signals
become distorted if not altogether eliminated. This, in turn,
may cause a misallocation of resources and thus inefficiency.
Impediments to the formation of markets through which individuals can bargain are significant deterrents to efficient
resource allocation. Identification of market failure and its
causes is central to the justification for and guidance of
government intervention.
Assume there exists a pleasant residential area on the
edge of a city. A farmer living adjacent to this neighborhood
decides to sell a portion of his land. The highest bidder turns
out to be an individual who plans to build a cement factory
on the site.81 Assuming the factory is built, the cement company will have to pay the costs of the raw materials, labor,
and any capital investments necessary to produce cement.
However, it is possible that there will be costs of operation
which the cement company will not have to bear. Rather it
might impose those costs on other parties. Adjacent
residents may bear the cost of the factory's use of the air as a
place to emit dust and smoke. The factory might be a source
of noise pollution. Also, the scenic value of the countryside
might be reduced by the presence of the factory. These effects may have health and aesthetic costs and they may also
reduce the value of property in the residential neighborhood.
A failure to confront the cement plant with the true costs of
its activities would simply result in the overproduction of cement. 8
by individuals. The adjective "social" is used to indicate that the costs accrue so
members of society other than those participating in transactions intended to be
"private".
80. For a brief and readable discussion of this point see, Note, Inverse Condemnation,
supra note 7 at 788-792; and Gordon, supra note 71.
81. Assume, for now, no limits on land uses are created by zoning ordinances.
82. All costs would not be accounted for in the price of cement. Assuming the good is
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Traditional welfare economic analysis would indicate
that this might clearly be a case for land use regulation.
Regardless of how obvious the case for regulation may seem,
some difficult analytical questions must be addressed before
implementing policies. In his definitive article, "The Problem of Social Cost", 83 Professor Coase reminded both

academics and policy makers that the first hint of externality problems should not lead to automatic conclusions about
the necessity of government intervention.
The question is commonly thought of as one in
which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be
decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is
wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a
reciprocal nature. To avoid harm to B would inflict
harm on A. The real question that has to be decided
is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be
The problem is to avoid the
allowed to harm A?
84
more serious harm.

Disregarding for now other important issues discussed in his
article, Coase pointed out that the market could, under certain conditions, work to internalize most external effects
through negotiation. Assuming that, at any moment in time
there is a legally sanctioned structure of property rights in
existence and the cost of exchanging and enforcing those
rights (i.e. transaction costs)8" were zero, all externalities can
be internalized and all misallocations remedied through
market transactions.8" As one property rights scholar summarizes this position:
All that is needed is the establishment of a nonattenuated structure of property rights in all relevant resources and the problems will disappear in

83.
84.
85.

86.

price elastic, less would be consumed had the price reflected the actual costs of cement production. One other point must be made regarding the importance of the
price mechanism. If a firm tries to minimize its costs of production, it is doubtful
that a cement company would locate adjacent to a residential area where the price of
land tends to be high. Therefore, price itself can be a powerful force in segregating
land uses. Accord, Siegan, Non-Zoning In Houston, 13 J. LAW AND EcoN. 71 (1970.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 79.
Id. at 2.
Transactions costs include the costs of (i) gathering information about the persons
with whom one must bargain (ii) determining one's position and strategy, (iii)
negotiating an agreement, and (iv) enforcing the agreement. See, Coase, Id. at 15;
and Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. LAW AND
ECON. 11 (1964).
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules - A Comment, J. LAW AND ECON. 67, 68 (1968).
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the market as the process of exchange continues until all gains from trade are exhausted. That solution,
by definition, is efficient.8 7
The foregoing discussion points out two major causes of
market failure, namely, an imperfect or incomplete specification of legal rights and the presence of significant transactions costs which prevent parties from getting together and
negotiating in market transactions.8 8 Regardless of the extent to which property rights are defined and assigned, if the
transferability of those rights is prohibited by law or by the
presence of high transactions costs, it will be very difficult to
achieve efficiency through the market.
Given these problems, it is useful to return to the cement plant hypothetical. If the residents have a clearly
defined legal right to be free from air and noise pollution, or
to a scenic easement, they may assert their rights in court
and get appropriate relief.89 However, if they do not have
such legal rights, the only recourse is to attempt to bargain
with the cement plant. As a result of negotiation, the plant
could be bribed to cut down on its pollution or perhaps locate
elsewhere." But such negotiation is not always possible. The
costs of numerous residents getting together to bargain with
the cement plant are likely to be too high."1 It may turn out
Randall supra note 2, at 735.
Professor Posner has identified the requirements for an efficient system of property
rights: 1) universality, all resources must be owned or ownable by someone; 2) exclusivity, an individual holder of property rights must have sufficiently exclusive
control over the relevant resources to assure that he will both reap the benefits and
bear the full costs of his utilization of those resources; and 3) transferability,property rights must be transferable so that resources can gavitate to their highest valued
uses through the process of exchange. Posner, supra note 16, at 29-31.
89. The following alternatives should be considered when allocating rights and remedies
in incompatible land use cases: (i)where the transactions costs are low enough so as
not to prevent bargaining between the cement firm and the neighboring landowners,
then injunctive relief would be appropriate. Given clearly defined rights and low
transactions costs, negotiation would determine whether cement production is feasible in that area and at what level. (ii) However, where transactions costs are high or
the costs of closing down the plant altogether exceed the benefits to be derived from
injunctive relief, then damages should be awarded to the neighboring landowners as
compensation for the violation or acquisition of their rights. See, Calabresi and
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedra 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972); and Posner, supra note 16, at §§ 3.4-3-7,
4.12.
90. Alternatively, it is quite possible that the landowners could not "bribe" the cement
plant to alter its level of production. This fact reveals the force of the Coase
theorem. In this kind of case, many believe that is the initial assignment of a right
that will determine the prevailing use of land. However, if transaction costs are low,
negotiation (and market forces) will determine the prevailing land use independent
of the assignment of legal rights. Coase, supra note 79. But see, Mishan, ParetoOp87.
88.

timality and the Law, 19 OXFORD EcoN. PAPERS 255 (1967).

91.

A major problem is that of free riders. Of course, the point at which transactions
costs become prohibitive is largely an empirical question about which we know very
little. E.g., Crocker, Externalities,PropertyRights and TransactionsCosts: An EmpiricalStudy, 14 J. LAW AND ECON. 451 (1971).
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that the residents continue to bear the costs of pollution and
the consumers of cement purchase an underpriced product to
the extent that the costs of using the air as a factor of production have not been payed by the cement company; the
costs of discomfort from noise is still borne by the neighbors;
and an area of scenic value has been spoiled by the presence
of the plant."2
While the presence of high transaction costs renders the
market incapable of resolving efficiently the problem of incompatible land uses and, therefore, provides a justification
for government intervention in the form of land use planning, major problems remain. What use of land should
ultimately prevail or who should be compensated for their
loss of welfare or change in position are questions which
must be resolved. The nature of the problem immediately
suggests a role for the government decision maker in
mediating conflicting uses of land such as residential neighborhoods and cement factories."3 Perhaps the prescriptive
separation of incompatible land uses through public regulation could be justified on efficiency grounds. 4 But the problem is not always as easy as it is in the case of such grossly
incompatible land uses as cement factories and residential
neighborhoods. What if our hypothetical involved more subtle incompatibilities such as residential neighborhoods versus small grocery stores, medical clinics, apartment houses
or gas stations? Is it clear that the costs of incompatibility
in such cases justify intervention? This problem will be further developed in Part C of this Section where we contend
that the answer to such questions depends upon a comparison of the costs of incompatibility with the costs of
government regulation.
In addition to the problems of imperfect specification of
property rights and prohibitive transaction costs, there exist
two other possible justifications for government to act in the
92.
93.
94.

These costs will be reflected in the reduction of property values and increased
medical bills. General psychic and aesthetic costs are very real yet difficult to quantify.
Collector of whatever information is necessary to arrive at a result that would have
occurred in an efficient market.
For example, in those cases when we can state with relative certainty that there is a
correlation among (i) particular uses of land, (ii) the presence of costly external effects; and (iii) a likelihood of high transactions costs in private negotiation, separation of uses through zoning is only one method. A permit system might achieve a
tolerable result. Some externality-producing uses of land might be taxed.
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interest of achieving efficient resource allocation. First,

realization of the actual costs of using land in various ways
is, in part, a function of the availability of information concerning the short and long run effects of different land uses. 95
Information, like many other things, is scarce and often costly to obtain. While the production of information can benefit
from the incentives of private control, there are significant
theoretical reasons to believe that information will not be
produced in sufficient amounts in the market place.96 This
may justify a role for government in subsidizing the generation of information about the impact of land uses.9" In addition, there is another kind of information which contributes
to efficient private decision making. Individuals must know
what land is actually available and, perhaps more importantly, what legal rights attach to any particular parcel of land.9"
Certainly, a critical role of the state would be to make more
definite and certain those property rights in land which do
exist.9
A second impediment to efficient land allocation concerns the problem of "public goods". Reconsider for a moment our hypothetical case. Assume that the neighboring
residential landowners wish to purchase that portion of land
the farmer is willing to sell because they want to turn it into
a park. However, this land use preference for a park might
not be realized in the market. A park provides benefits which
can be consumed by some without reducing the amount
available to others. It is quite difficult to exclude individuals
from sharing in at least some of the scenic aesthetic and
recreational benefits of a park.'00 When the time comes to ac95.
96.

See, Haveman, supra note 33.
It has been argued that because the benefits to be derived from information generation cannot be captured cornpletely by the producer, information will be underproduced in the marketplace. F or a summary of relevant arguments see, Hirshleifer,
"Where Are We in the Theory of Information?" 63 AM. ECON. Assoc. PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS 31 (1973.

97.

For justification of a government role in mitigating informational problems see, e.g.,
BAUMOL,

98.
99.

100.

WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE

199-201 (2nd ed..

1965); ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION, (1974).
For the proposition that uncertainty about the law (i.e. legal rights) leads to inefficiency see, Hirsch, Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1233 (1974).
Certainly, a central role of the courts is to determine or make clear the rights of parties which appear before them. A recent and novel commitment to making clear and
definite existing rights in property is exemplified by MONTANA'S WATER USE ACT OF
1973 § 89-865. This legislation asserts a policy of protecting and preserving existing
property rights in water and establishes an elaborate process for determining what
property rights actually exist.
Such goods lack the critical feature of exclusivity. However, it is not suggested that
parks are examples of pure Samuelsonian public goods. See, Samuelson, The Pure
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tually negotiate the sale of the farmer's land and subsequently transform it into a park, it will clearly be in the interests of some to take a "free ride" on the efforts of others.
The allocative effects of "free riders" who attempt to internalize the benefits and externalize the costs of the provision
of a public good are to either not have the good supplied at
all; or have the good supplied in inadequate quantities. 10 1
Government can play a vital role in purchasing the land for
conversion into a park and in taxing those individuals who
are likely to derive the greatest benefits from the existence
of the park. 02
If the goal of land use planning and control is to
eliminate the inefficiency that results from market failure,
then the foregoing discussion provides a theoretical framework for addressing that problem. Imperfect property rights
specification, prohibitive transaction costs, public goods and
free riders are all causes of market failure which regulation
must be designed to overcome. In their efforts to eliminate
the external costs of private activity, planners must
generate information about individual preferences so that
land use regulatory decisions might approach that result
which an efficient market would have accomplished. This
task is, by no means, simple. Because government has problems of its own in bringing about efficient results, market
failure does not provide an automatic justification for intervention.
C. Government Failure:Obstacles To Effective
Intervention
In making the choice between market and non-market
allocation,10 3 it is important to remember that the presence

of market failure provides only a necessary and not a suffi-

101.

Theory of PublicExpenditure, 36 REV. ECON. AND STATS. 350 (1955). One can imagine ways of excluding others from some of the benefits of parks (i.e. user fees). Yet
allocating efficiently goods which exhibit only varying degrees of "publicness" can
p rove to be difficult in the marketplace. Herber, supra note 49, at 26, 44-61.
Classic treatment of the problem is in OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). See also, BUCHANAN, THE DE-

MAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GooDs (1968).
102. But see, Coase, The Lighthouse In Economics, 17 J. LAW AND ECON. 357 (1974) for
the proposition that actual cases receptive to the classic justification for government provided public goods seem to be rare and that a careful factual examination
of each case must be conducted before deciding the issue of government provision.
103. Professor Posner, supra note 16, at 271 correctly points out that choices between
market and nonmarket forms of allocation also involve choices between private (the
common law) and public forms of regulation.
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cient justification for government intervention. There are
two major reasons for this. First, government also fails in its
attempt to achieve efficient resource allocation. There is no
guarantee that public control of allocation can or will be
more efficient than private allocation. Second, there are
times when the cost of government intervention will exceed
the benefits to be derived from such intervention. The most
that can be offered in the way of an approach to evaluating
these problems is to suggest a careful weighing of the advantages of public versus private control of allocation in each
particular situation.
The purpose of this Section is to review some problems
which can prevent government from achieving efficient
results when it intervenes to correct failures of the market.
The following three topics will be addressed: 1) The ability of
traditional public land use planning methods to eliminate
the costs of external effects; 2) The question of whether
public decision makers face real incentives to make efficient
allocative decisions regarding the use of land; and 3) The
matter of discovering the optimal jurisdiction for land use
controls.' 4 What follows is not an elaborate discourse on
each of these topics. Rather, issues will be raised merely as a
means of elucidating potential hazards to effective planning.
1. Planning Our Way To Efficiency?
There are two essential steps to be taken when considering the effectiveness of land use planning in attempting to
deal with the external effects which result from actual
market failure.105 First, there must be some method for identifying externalities as well as the cause for their existence.
This is not an easy task and while there is not a great abundance of empirical work in the area of land use, attempts
have been made to deal with the technical problem of identifying and measuring external effects." 6 The second step involves a determination of whether land use planning actually
mitigates the external effects it anticipates. This is just
another way of saying that we need to be able to evaluate the
This issue involves determining the basis for "statewide" as opposed to more decentralized or more centralized forms of land use planning.
105. Ervin et. al supra note 7, at 74-75.
106. See, cites contained at note 47 supra. See also, Crecine et. al Urban Property
Markets: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications for MunicipalZoning, 10
J. LAW AND ECON. 79 (1967).
104.
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effectiveness of land use planning methods. Unless we can
say that things have improved as a result of regulatory efforts, it would seem difficult indeed to justify the cost of
regulating.
There is no scientifically objective method available for
detecting the existence of externalities. The problem is not
only an empirical one, but a conceptual one as well. What is
an externality? Even if we were able to identify some external effects which the market place could not address because
of transaction costs, there is no guarantee that the market
would internalize those costs if it could. The willingness to
put up with certain things in life is a subjective matter." 7
This fact merely reinforces the importance of having planners gather data regarding the preferences of their constituents before actually engaging in regulatory policy
making." 8
Planning proceeds on the basis that incompatible uses
of land can be separated. Implementation of this policy
usually begins with the development of a land use plan or
map which specifies where certain uses of land may occur.
Given what has been said about the subjective nature of the
problem, drawing up the plan can be a difficult job. Of
course, there are probably some incompatibilities which are
so significant that we can assume some rough empirical correlation between the presence of a particular land use and
the magnitude of the costs it would impose on neighboring
landowners. However, when planners get down to the
business of dealing with more subtle incompatibilities in
land uses, it is unclear whether locations should be specified
for such uses or not. Some questions which are central to this
problem must be asked. First, what costs would be imposed
on existing owners of property by having a more detailed
and restrictive specification of permissible land uses? Certainly the expectancy value of some land would decrease if
the range of permissible uses were more specifically detailed.
If the courts are unsympathetic to the claims of property
owners for just compensation, real welfare losses might
107.
108.

This perspective is implicit in Buchanan and Stubblebine's essay, supra note 79
where they attempt to distinguish between Pareto-relevant and Pareto-irrelevant
externalities.
To the extent that public allocation attempts to enhance efficiency, it would be
critical to aggregate and be responsive to the preferences of individual constituents.
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result." 9 Second, would the costs of a more detailed
specification of land uses exceed the benefits which could be
derived from that specification? One commentator provides
a succinct response to this question:
Land use controls essentially take an "all or
nothing" approach in that certain uses are either
allowed or prohibited. Such an approach produces
misallocations because the proper economic goal is
not to prohibit all uses which generate externalities,
but only to facilitate an accurate determination of
whether a particular 110use is feasible when all the
costs are considered.
Although flexibility devices such as permits and variances
could act as safety valves in allowing for "feasible" uses
which are prohibited by land use regulations, it is unlikely
that this administrative approach to allocation would be less
costly than the market itself."' Also, even if market failure
prevented the market from operating well in this capacity,
there are likely to exist entirely more effective means of
public control than the segregation of land uses. 2
Some studies have been conducted in an attempt to
ascertain the actual effectiveness of land use regulation.
There is evidence which suggests that the externalities anticipated by land use plans do not even exist.11 3 Perhaps the
most controversial work has been performed by Bernard
Siegan who suggests, in part as a result of his study of
Houston, Texas, that zoning has not proven to be an effective means of attaining efficient land use and, in fact,
generates significant costs by placing inordinate burdens on
the poor. " As the evidence begins to accumulate on land use
109.

110.
111.

112.
113.
114.

The courts have generally recognized as constitutionally valid regulations which do
not prohibit all reasonable and feasible uses of land. Averne Bay Construction Co. v.
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 NE2d 587 (1938). See discussion in Stoebuck supra note
55 at 172-175. Government, therefore, has the potential of using a large amount of
discretion in deciding how restrictively it may define land uses without payment of
compensation.
Note, Inverse Condemnation, supra note 7, at 791.
The relevant comparison would be between the costs of administering a system of
public land use controls with the costs of transacting in the land market and/or implementing voluntary land use agreements such as those anticipated by Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 7.
Methods might be borrowed from the area of pollution control. See, Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions:A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REv. 429.
(1971).
See, supra note 46.
Siegan, Controlling Other People's Property Through Covenants, Zoning, State and
FederalRegulation, 5 ENv. L. 385 (1975).
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planning and regulation, it becomes apparent that we may
do well to look to alternative methods of dealing with social
costs generated by private land use decisions." 5
2.

Planning and The Incentives of Public Servants

Land use control is frequently characterized as a means
of placing limitations on the rights of individuals to make
choices regarding the disposition of their land. Regulation is
preceived only as a means of limiting private action but this
view of the matter is incomplete. As more and more substantive resource allocation problems are affected by government regulation, there is not only an increasing limitation on
private rights, but an attendant expansion of the rights of
government to control various economic activities.1 1 6 This
right of state and local government to affect social processes
derives from its police power." 7 Today, the scope of activities which can be affected by the police power has increased dramatically.
Two significant consequences flow from the expansion
of police power activity. First, government has increasing
power to define those rights which will exist. 118 This is exemplified by the process of land use planning through which
the state defines permissible uses of land. Legislative bodies
define rights, but those rights may be defined so vaguely
that either administrative agencies or the courts are effectively left with the task of defining them more precisely." 9
As Section IV and V of this article argue, vagueness
115.
116.

117
118.

Supra note 42.
Central to this discussion is the distinction between government's role pursuant to
the rights it possesses (which right it' may acquire from or transfer to private individuals subject to any constitutional limits) and government's role as the definor
of rights. This distinction is developed and related to a general theory of rights in a
forthcoming paper - Huffman and Plantico, PropertyRights and Social Welfare in
a ConstitutionalDemocracy:A Casefor the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See, discussion in Stoebuck, supra
note 55, Chap. 6.
The purposes for which government may regulate land (i.e. define rights in land) are

both broad and diverse. See, ANDERSON, 2
119.

AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING,

Chap. 9

(1976).
The standard which guides much rights definition by public decision making bodies
is "public interest" or "public welfare". The inherent vagueness in this standard is
obvious. The words of Justice Douglas suggest that this vague standard affords
government great latitude in defining rights. "The concept of public welfare is broad
and inclusive . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as
carefully patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). To the extent that
legislative bodies adopt vague legislation, the specific content of rights will be determined by other government bodies which either implement legislation (agencies) or
adjudicate specific claims arising under the legislation (courts).
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characterizes the enabling legislation for the Oregon
statewide system of land use planning and therefore creates
opportunities for more precise rights definition by nonlegislative bodies.
A second major consequence involves the effect of
allocating rights through public agencies. When decisions
are made in the private sector, they are shaped and constrained by significant incentives. Assuming the efficient
operation of markets, individuals are directly faced with the
private and social costs of their decisions. However, when
allocative problems are taken out of the market and put in
the hands of public servants, decision making is influenced
by qualitatively different incentives. Price, for example, is
no longer a direct constraint on decision making. New factors come into play such as the "power" of those private
groups who seek to influence public decisions. There are incentives to make politically rather than allocatively efficient
decisions.2 0 Although many agencies purport to insulate
themselves from the political forces surrounding their
"public" position, the fact is that they are frequently faced
with incentives to respond to precisely those political influences.'
Recently, discussions of the regulatory process by Professors Stigler, Posner, and Peltzman 22 have advanced the
general thesis that agencies, as arms of the state, are in a
position to essentially "produce" regulation. As a result,
private groups make demands for regulations which have
the ultimate effect of transferring wealth.' 3 This general
thesis can provide analytical insight to the process of land
use regulation. Where land use regulators are in a position to
120.

Assuming the utility maximizing behavior of public servants, the question of what
is, in fact, "politically efficient" requires an examination of that which public officials value (it has been suggested that increasing agency budgets, vote maximization, accumulating power and prestige, perpetuating and extending agency programs and even maximizing personal income are common goals of legislators and/or
bureaucrats). See generally, Symposium: Economic Analysis of PoliticalBehavior,

18 J.

LAW AND ECON.

BUREAUCRACY

121.
122.

INSIDE

DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1969.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. AND MGMT. Sci. 3
(1971); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. AND MGMT. ScI.
335 (1974); Peltzman, "Toward A More GeneralTheory ofRegulation, 19 J. LAW AND

See generally, REDFORD,

ECON.

123.

587-918 (1975); North, supra note 23 and DOWNS,

(1967).

211 (1976).

price controls, restrictions on entry
Examples are too numerous to mention here (i.e.
to the market, etc.). For a discussion of the panoply of restrictions to the land

market see Hagman, supra note 58.
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define rights and thereby supply regulation, various interest
groups may attempt to secure and increase wealth by
demanding favorable regulation. This, of course, suggests
that agencies will be faced with demands to make decisions
with primarily distributional impacts. 2 " Studies in the land
use area suggest that the nature of much regulation supports this thesis.'2 5 If this is true, it raises serious doubts
about the actual propensities of agencies to base their
regulatory policies on an efficiency rationale.
3.

The Optimal Jurisdiction

A final issue concerning the ability of government to
deal effectively with market failure goes directly to the heart
of statewide land use planning. This issue involves the problem of determining the appropriate jurisdictional level at
which land use policies should be formulated and from which
the implementatior of these policies should be directed. A
decision on this issue requires consideration of a few
analytical questions which will be discussed briefly here.
The familiar and persistent rhetoric of "local
autonomy" suggests that communities are still very much
interested in being masters of their own destinies. However,
it is necessary to have some analytical framework in order to
determine whether a jurisdiction beyond the local level is required to handle certain land use problems. The concepts of
"externality" and "market failure" need only be extended
somewhat to provide such a framework.
It was argued earlier that the failure of markets to internalize costs provided a justification for government intervention. If, for example, only individuals within a particular municipality were affected by the externality in question (ugly billboards on main street or soot from a local factory) then the municipality's collective decision making
body is best suited for the task of aggregating local
124.

125.

An unexplored corrolary to the theory of economic regulation is the extent to which
similar incentives of interest groups result in demands for vague legislation. Well
organized interests at the agency level may attempt to influence the writing of
vague laws because they are confident of their ability to influence the specific decisions of. regulatory bodies. To the best of our knowledge, this hypothesis is unexplored in the land use area.
See, e.g., Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 7, at 432; Ervin et. al,
supra note 7, at 92-94; Siegan, supra note 122.
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preferences on local land use matters.' 6 If and when local
uses of land have negative impacts on neighboring communities and the transaction costs of communities resolving
these matters themselves are prohibitive, there may be a
basis for having a more encompassing jurisdiction assist in
the problem.'2 7 Of course, certain factors would have to be
weighed before opting for this approach. In addition to the
fact that the costs of intervention should never exceed its
benefits, there is always the possibility that local interests
will be subordinated in state decision making processes. If
the problem at hand affects only a small percentage of the
state, there are dangers
that irrelevant interests will in28
fluence the outcome.'

Unless it can be demonstrated that the actions of
private parties within communities, or that communities
themselves impose costs of statewide significance, it is very
difficult to justify statewide intervention in the land use process. Certainly, communities can impose costs on each other
by adopting specific kinds of policies. For example, "no
growth" ordinances which restrict the supply of housing and
basic services may have the effect of forcing neighboring
communities to deal with the costs of growing
populations.'2 9 However, absent a well-supported finding of
these intra-state costs, there seems to be no justification on
efficiency grounds for state mandated land use planning or
the imposition of substantive goals by state government or
local communities.
One final example should be raised here. Frequently,
many citizens of a state will share in the benefits of a particular amenity resource which is, in effect, common property. Absent some regulatory control, the use of a common
126.

See, e.g., Oates, FISCAL FEDERALISM 11-13 (1972); Stigler, Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government, in Joint Econ. Comm., FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 213 (Jt.Comm. Print 1967); Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1954).
127. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1215-1216
(1977). However, as always, the costs of utilizing an agency with more extensive control should never exceed the benefits to be derived from that control. Zerbe, Optimal
EnvironmentalJurisdictions,4 ECOLOGY L. QTR. 193, 223 (1974).
128. Ideally, those represented within any collective decision making body attempting to
resolve problems of resource misallocation would also be the ones who are actually
affected by the externality in question. The present division of government jurisdictions into
- 'state
"local" - "federal" does not always lend itself to such specific correlation.

129.

See. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 7, at 403, 450.
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property resource can result in a misallocation of resources.
The problem arises because access to common property is
often unrestricted and unless some form of regulation
restricts entry, the resource will be over-exploited."" Since
the benefits of such resources frequently accrue to a large
percentage of the state polity, the relevant jurisdiction to
control the commons would appear to be state
government. 3 1
The cost internalization case for land use regulation
developed in this Section provides both an approach to the
problem of land use planning as well as an analytical
framework for evaluating existing regulatory mechanisms.
The purpose this approach serves, above all others, is to
point to the necessity of establishing clearly the relationship
between regulatory means and ends as well as to clarify what
information is needed to proceed intelligently with land use
problems. With this in mind, we now turn to a critique of the
Oregon statewide planning system.
III.

THE OREGON SYSTEM OF LAND USE PLANNING

Land use planning in Oregon evidences very little
analytical foundation in the terms discussed above. Articulated objectives of planning tend to be specific
preferences for resource use, and are therefore little more
than subjective value statements. There has been no effort
to identify broader social objectives nor to relate those objectives to the planning system provided for their realization.
That the Oregon planning system seems to be so widely supported speaks not to the quality of the Oregon system, but
to the remarkable faith of the Oregonians who endorse it. It
is essentially a foundationless system. Its goals are inadequately articulated and its processes are unrelated to what
vague goals have been articulated. There is, it would appear,
a presumption in favor of the correctness of land use planning. The fact that many Oregonians are happy with their
planning system is admittedly proof that it has delivered
results to their liking. But in the design of social institu130.
131.

The classic discussions are Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Hardin The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
See generally, Zerbe, supra note 127: HAEFELE, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

(1973).
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tions, the proof of the pudding is not in the eating. The proof
must be in the recipe, the constitutional and statutory
design, for although the pudding tastes good today, it may
be a function of the good taste of the cook and not the
prescription of the recipe. The analysis in the preceeding sections suggests that a system which delivers good and bad
results depending upon who is making the decisions is a
system which can be improved. That is the case with the
Oregon land use planning system.
The problem which Senate Bill 100 purports to address
is that of "uncoordinated use of lands" which "threatens the
orderly development, the environment.., the health, safety,
order, convenience, prosperity and welfare of the people of
this state."' ' 32 However, Senate Bill 100 does a poor job of articulating the particular purposes for which land use is to be
coordinated. The only language in the quoted section which
gives even vague guidance is that which designates tl.e purposes of health and safety. "Orderly development," "order,"
and "convenience" are all terms which, like coordinated,
have meaning only in relation to particular objectives. What
is order for one purpose may be chaos for another. Prosperity
and welfare are terms without objective meaning except to
the extent that individual judgements can be meaningfully
combined into an integrated whole. Whether a society is
prosperous which has vast areas of wilderness as compared
to a society having enormous stocks of lumber for housing is
entirely a question of the values of the individual members of
society. There are no abstract definitions of prosperity and
welfare.
Section 2 of the legislation, which is labeled a policy
statement, adds nothing to the search for a direction for
statewide land use planning. "In order to assure the highest
possible level of liveability . . .," the Legislative Assembly
determines that "properly prepared and coordinated comprehensive plans" are needed. 133 Ask a hundred people what
"the highest possible level of liveability" is and you will get
one hundred different answers. It is probably a paradigm of
Oregon Land Use Regulation that very dense concentration
of human residences results in a low level of liveability.
132.
133.

OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005(1) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.010 (1977).
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Perhaps that is an accurate reflection of the opinions of
many Oregonians, which one would expect since they have
chosen to live in Oregon where human settlement is not very
dense. But how is it explained that thousands of people
choose to live in housing which often has over a thousand
people on a single city block and the nearest park several
miles away? It is not uncommon in many American cities,
nor are all of those people wishing they lived in Oregon. As
with the terms employed in Section 1, liveability is meaningless except in relation to particular purposes and par34
ticular individuals.
Although the Act goes on for another fifty-six sections,
there is nothing which comes any closer to giving some direction to its application. Section 3 defines a comprehensive
plan as a "generalized, coordinated land use map and policy
statement . . . that interrelates all functional and natural
systems and activities relating to the use of lands."' 3 As the
decisions in the case law indicate, this definition has left
everybody in the dark as to what a comprehensive plan really is, or what, under the state law, a comprehensive plan is
supposed to be.
Section 43 of the Act, an amendment of ORS 215.055,
provided that comprehensive plans "shall be designed to
promote the public health, safety, and general welfare .. 136
They are objectives with which surely no one will disagree in
the abstract, but with which few will agree on specifics. Section 43 went on to indicate what factors are relevant in the
formulation of the plan, but nothing was added in terms of
defining goals. The effect was merely to require that comprehensive plans be based upon an inventory of the human
and natural resources of the area for which the plan is being
designed, a seemingly obvious requirement.
But even the vague guidance offered by Section 43 of
Senate Bill 100 is no longer part of Oregon's law, having
been repealed by the legislature in 1977."'1 The repealing
legislation provides substitute direction only to the extent
134.
135.
136.
137.

Not only do values vary among individuals, but an individual's values will vary over
time.
Oa. REV. STAT. § 197.015(4) (1977).
OR. REv. STAT. § 215.055(1) (1975).
OREGON LAWS, Chapt. 766, § 16 (1977).
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that it requires comprehensive plans to be "in conformity
with the statewide planning goals and any subsequent revisions or amendments thereof."' 3 8 The effect of this amendment is to further amplify the powers of the appointed Land
Conservation and Development Commission, which is discussed below.
Whether or not one agrees with the wisdom or need for
statewide land use regulation, there should be general agreement in a system of representative government that once it
is decided to have state-wide planning the legislature is the
body which ought to establish the goals for that planning. 13 9
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Senate Bill 100 is
that it gives to the state the power to regulate land use in the
state and then abdicates that power to a Commission of
seven appointed members.' 40 The finality of the abdication is
emphasized by Section 48 of the Act which restates the provisions of ORS 215.515, a legislative statement of general
planning goals, and then makes it clear that they will continue to apply only for an interim period before complete abdication. 4 ' Although vague, 142 the standards stated in ORS
215.515 were at least evidence of a legislative interest in retaining control over the land regulation process.
Having pointed out the total lack of standards for implementation of the Act, it should be said that there is really
no surprise in finding such a directionless piece of legislation. It merely reflects the fact that the problem with which
the legislation deals is one of resource allocation, and as indicated in the first sections of this article, that is a problem
which can only be resolved in a society of individuals, by
138.

139.

140.
141.

142.

§ 215.050(3) (1977).
It is fundamental to any representative system that the representatives make the
decisions delegated to them. The extent to which the legislature may delegate
decision-making to administrators is a continuing issue. The total lack of legislative
guidelines in Senate Bill 100, and the attenuated control retained by the legislature
over LCDC both suggest that the representative principle is being violated in
Oregon land use planning. For consideration of the delegation issue in the Federal
context see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), Schecter Poultry v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and National Cable Television Association v.
United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.030 to § 197.060 (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 215.515(2) (1977).
Vague legislative language may be the result of poor drafting, a lack of information
necessary for greater specificity, or intentional introduction or uncertainty for
reasons of political compromise or with the hope of using uncertainty to particular
advantage at some future time. See, Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,
3 VANDERBILT LAW REV. 407 (1950).
OR. REV. STAT.
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relying on people's needs and wants as they perceive them.'43
Any body which truly represents the people of Oregon would
be unable to establish anything but the most general of standards. By shifting the standard writing task to a commission of seven members, it is possible to write increasingly
specific standards only as the commission is able to increasingly isolate itself from the people of the state.
The Land Conservation and Development Commission44
of seven individuals appointed by the Governor.
body
is a
The Governor is restricted to having at least one member
from each congressional district, one member who is an
elected city or county official at the time of his
appointment,'

45

and one but not more than two members

from Multnomah County. 46' In addition, Commission
members are staggered and their appointment is subject to
Senate

confirmation.'

47

All

of

these

provisions

are

presumably to assure that the Commission will be objective
and not subject to partisan pressures. Other restrictions
might have been imposed. For example, bipartisanship in
terms of political party membership might have been required. It is doubtful, however, whether more or fewer
restrictions on membership would have made any difference
in terms of the actions of the Commission. The fact is that
the Commission is required under the statute to make a vast
range of political decisions.
There is no way to make a political decision anything
but political and there are no degrees of politicalness. Politics is the business of trying to influence decision makers to
decide in a way which benefits the politician. Anybody having the power to make allocative decisions for others is in the
business of politics and everyone having a sufficient interest
in the outcome of the decision to seek to influence it is a
143.

144.

145.
146.
147.

Certainly these are alternative allocative principles. For example it would be
theoretically possible to allocate all resources on the basis of energy efficiency. For
the application of energy efficiency theory to human affairs, see, ODUM, ENVIRONMENT, POWER, AND SOCIETY (1971).
Until July 1, 1979, the Commission may have eight members as a result of a 1977
law ORECON LAWS, Chap. 664, § 4(a) which provides for immediate appointment of
an elected city or county official. This adjustment was necessary since the terms of
existing Commission Members, none of whom is an elected city or county official,
did not expire until July 1, 1979.
This provision was added in 1977 in response to widespread belief among local
governments that their interests had often been ignored by the LCDC.
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.030 (1977).
Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.030(1) (1977).
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politician. As in the market place, who gets what depends
upon what they can afford. The distribution of political
power is at least as disproportionate as the distribution of
1
financial wealth.

48

The preceding point requires re-emphasis. Those who insist that planning in the "public interest" will result from an
apolitical decision-making process are at least fooling
themselves, but are more likely trying to fool those who are
disgruntled about the outcome of planning decisions. A
casual ear to the rhetoric of any political campaign will hear
nothing but talk of who in society can expect to get what if
the speaking candidate is elected. Not all promises are kept
nor could they be, for many of them conflict, but what is important is that the subject matter of politics is resource
allocation. Every person in society wants a lot of things and
there simply are not enough resources to satisfy everyone's
desires. How those resources which are allocated publicly are
in fact allocated is a function of the workings of the political
system. Planning is government resource allocation, and we
should not be so naive as to believe that there are apolitical
solutions or that we can design an apolitical process to reach
allocative solutions. What we must do is recognize that
public resource allocation is the business of politics and to
concentrate on the task of designing a political process
which will bring the allocative result we desire. This will
never be done until we have articulated our goals for public
resource allocation.
Under Senate Bill 100 the LCDC is assigned numerous
functions. The Commission is to "establish state-wide planning goals consistent with regional, county and city concerns. 49 Although these goals are subject to review by a
Joint Legislative Committee on Land Use,150 they go into ef148.

149.
150.

The goal of legislative apportionment (an element of political power distribution) is
to "accommodate within a system of representative government the interests and
aspirations of diverse groups of people, without subjecting any group or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or highly organized majority."
Associate Justice Stewart dissenting in Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 at 748-749
(1964). See also, SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT at 229-230
(1964). "[T]he electoral process is not the only political process. Indeed a major share
of our politics consists of negotiations, both public and private, among various interest groups and segments of government. In this sphere of negotiations, political
equality is difficult to attain. In fact, it is extremely difficult to assess what degree
of inequality actually exists."
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040(2)(a) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.135(3) (1977).
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fect without legislative approval and remain in effect apparently until the Legislature takes affirmative steps to
alter the stated goals. Hence, seven appointed individuals
will somehow arrive at a set of goals which will govern land
use planning for the entire state, from metropolitan Portland
to the deserts of eastern Oregon. The Commission's announced goals evidence the enormous difficulty if not impossibility of this task. 5
As of February, 1978, the LCDC has promulgated nineteen goals and guidelines for Oregon land use planning.'5 2
Exemplary of the problem faced by the LCDC in satisfying
the whole spectrum of Oregon political interests are repeated
provisions which allow particular goals not to be met if other
objectives are more important. For example, goal number
151.
152.

Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission, OREGON LAND USE
HANDBOOK, Chapter 2 (1978).
1. To develop a citizen involvement program that insures the opportunity for
citizens to be involved in all phases of the planning process.
2. To establish a land use planning process and policy framework or a basis for all
decisions actions related to use of land and to assure adequate factual basis for
such decisions and actions.
37 To preserve and maintain agricultural lands.
4. To conserve forest lands for forest uses.
5. To conserve open space and protect natural and scenic resources.
6. To maintain and improve the quality of the air, water and land resources of the
state.
7. To protect life and property from natural disasters and hazards.
8. To satisfy the recreational needs of the citizens of the state and visitors.
9. To diversify and improve the economy of the state.
10. To provide for the housing needs of the citizens of the state.
11. To plan and develop a timely, orderly and efficient arrangement of public
facilities and services to serve as a framework for urban and rural development.
12. To provide and encourage a safe, convenient and economic transportation
system.
13. To conserve energy.
14. To provide for an orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban land use.
15. To protect, conserve, enhance, and maintain the natural, scenic, historical,
agricultural, economic and recreational qualities of lands along the Willamette
River as the Willamette River Greenway.
16. To recognize and protect the unique environmental, economic and social values
of each estuary and associated wetlands; and to protect, maintain, where appropriate develop, and where appropriate restore the long-term environmental,
economic and social values, diversity and benefits of Oregon's estuaries.
17. To conserve, protect, where appropriate develop and where appropriate restore
the resources and benefits of all coastal shorelands, recognizing their value for
protection and maintenance of water quality, fish and wildlife habitat, waterdependent uses, economic resources and recreation and aesthetics. The
management of those shore land areas shall be compatible with the
characteristics of the adjacent coastal waters; and to reduce the hazard to
human life and property, and the adverse effects upon water quality and fish
and wildlife habitat, resulting from the use and enjoyment of Oregon's coastal
shorelands.
18. To conserve, protect, where appropriate develop, and where appropriate restore
the resources and benefits of coastal beach and dune areas; and to reduce the
hazard to human life and property from natural or man-induced actions
associated with these areas.
19. To conserve the long-term values, benefits and natural resources of the nearshore ocean, and the continental shelf.
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three is "To preserve and maintain agricultural lands." ' 3 In
pursuing this goal planners are instructed that the:
Conversion of rural agricultural land to urbanizable
land shall be based upon consideration of the following factors: (1) environmental, energy, social and
economic consequences; (2) demonstrated need consistent with LCDC goals; (3) unavailability of an
alternative suitable location for the requested use;
(4) compatibility of the proposed use with related
agricultural land; and (5) the retention of Class I, II,
III and IV to convert rural agricultural land to urbanizable land shall follow the procedures and requirements set forth in the Land Use Planning goal
(Goal 2) for goal exceptions.' 54
Consideration number one is the biggest hedge of all since it
essentially requires that the planner reconsider the fundamental land allocation issue which brought the goals into
existence in the first place. If the decision to convert rural
land to urban land is to depend upon the "environmental,
energy, social and economic consequences," we know precisely what we should have known all along - the land use
decision should be socially optimal. The goal in no way helps
us to know what is optimal, nor has the focus of the particular goal on agricultural use given us any basis on which
to assess agricultural uses in relation to alternative uses.
Goal number fourteen is exemplary of the same lack of
direction. That goal is "To provide for an orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban land use."' 55 Factors to
be considered in making that decision include:
(1) Demonstrated need to accommodate longrange urban population growth requirements
consistent with LCDC goals;
(2) Need for housing, employment opportunities,
and livability;
(3) Orderly and economic provision for public
facilities and services;
(4) Maximum efficiency of land uses within and on
the fringe of the existing urban area;
153. 1d at 13.
154. Id
155. Id at 38.
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(5)

Environmental, energy, economic and social
consequences;

(6)

Retention of agricultural land as defined, with
Class I being the highest priority for retention
and Class VI the lowest priority; and,

(7)

Compatibility of the proposed urban uses with
nearby agricultural activities. 5 '

Consideration number four is, like the factors to be considered in conjunction with the agricultural land goal, a simple restatement of the basic land allocation issues. Efficiency
as used here can only mean the optimum social use of urbanfringe lands - that is the lands should be urbanized or not
depending upon whether society will benefit more from their
urbanization or retention as agricultural lands. Consideration number six refines the issue a bit by reminding the planner that Class I land should have a higher priority for
agricultural use than Class VI land. In other words fertile
bottom lands are better for agriculture than rocky hill tops.
Surely any individual involved in the sale or acquisition of
land would not have to be reminded of a fact so obvious.
That some Class I lands have been urbanized only evidences
that even the best farming lands have been deemed at
various times to be more valuable for urban uses.
A recent decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals illustrated the difficulty of requiring compliance with both
goal three (agricultural lands) and goal fourteen (urban
lands). In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Benton County,'5 7 the
petitioners appealed the approval of subdivision plans for
land located in an "Agricultural/Forestry" district under the
county zoning ordinance and on "agriculture, forestry and/or
flood plain" area under the county comprehensive plan. The
petitioners contended that the approval of the subdivision
plans was contrary to LCDC goal number three because the
lands in question were "agricultural lands" under Oregon
law. 58 The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners absolutist approach pointing out that goal three requires the
designation of agricultural lands "consistent with existing
needs for agricultural production, forestry and open
156.
157.
158.

Id
32 Or. App. 413 (1978).
ORs 215.203.
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space. ' ' 169 Quoting from their earlier opinion in Sunnyside
Neighborhood v. Clackamas County,'60 the Court said that

"local governments are required to address and accommodate as much as possible all applicable planning goals."
That requires, observes the Court, the application of goal
three in view of the objective of goal fourteen. There is no
basis for a judicial determination of compliance.
But the objective of this article is not to defend or
justify existing land use patterns. The analysis of Section
II recognizes that many current land uses are likely not to
be optimal. Rather the objective of this article is to assess
the alternative institutional arrangements under Oregon law
for land allocation. An examination of the goals and
guidelines which have been promulgated by the LCDC to
date indicate that there has been little if any progress made
beyond the statement in various ways of the broad land
allocation issue.
The only goal which appears to take a positive stance in
favor of a particular use of lands is number fifteen which
relates to the Willamette River Greenway.' 6 ' That goal says
that the Greenway will exist and that comprehensive plans
must be in compliance with the Greenway program.
However, the decision to prefer particular uses over others
along the Willamette River was in fact made by the Oregon
Legislature when it set up the Greenway program.'62 LCDC
goal number fifteen thus simply requires local planners to
comply with existing state law.
A goal by goal critique would lead to similar conclusions
in every case, but a final comment on goal number two will
suffice to confirm the conclusion that the LCDC's goals and
guidelines have done little or nothing to aid in the making of
land use choices. Goal number two sets out the process for
land use planning.1 63 Part II of that goal allows for exemptions to the statewide goals and sets forth the following considerations in granting exceptions:
159 -a2 Or. Adv. 426-427.
160. 27 Or. App. 647, 654, 557 P.2d 1375 (1976).
161. Id. at 41.
162. Ore. Rev. Stat. 390 (1977).
163. Oregon Land Use Handbook, supra note 164 at 7.
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(a) Why those other uses should be provided for;
(b) What alternative locations within the area
could be used for the proposed uses;
(c) What are the long term environmental,
economical, social and energy consequences to
the locality, the region or the state from not applying the goal or permitting the alternative
use;
(d) A finding that the proposed uses will be compatible with other adjacent uses.'"4
Again the factors which are to be considered in granting exceptions simply restate the basic problem of choosing among
alternative land uses.
In the face of all of this criticism of the LCDC's formulated goals and guidelines, there is a basic point to be
made on the affirmative side. Taken individually, the goals
and their stated considerations for implementation have little substantive direction. Taken as a whole, however, the
goals do articulate the multitude of considerations which are
relevant to any land use choice. In this way the goals and
guidelines require that planners perform an impact study
prior to making any planning decisions. It is a requirement
similar in form, although broader in substance, to the well
known environmental impact statement process.
Although it may appear obvious that a land use decision
should involve the consideration of all land use alternatives
and the external consequences of those alternatives, which
are the considerations required by the LCDC goals and
guidelines, it is clear that public decision makers do not
always take into account all of the relevant considerations.
Thus, there is surely something to be gained by requiring
public planners to demonstrate that they have considered
the alternatives and their consequences. Such a demonstration by the public planner will be sufficient, 65' whatever the
actual allocative choices, but assuming that public planners
164. Id at 8.
165. This statement is true only if judges perceive their role as being limited to the interpretation and enforcement of existing law. When judges view their role, as many do,
to be the resolution of social problems, planners will have to demonstrate that they
have made the "best" choice in addition to demonstrating that they have considered
the alternatives. Arguments against the latter approach to judging are implied in
Part IV.
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are motivated to improve the public condition, these essentially procedural requirements of the goals and guidelines
should have some benefits.
The LCDC is authorized to issue permits for activities of
state-wide significance, ' and to recommend designation of
areas of critical state concern."'6 These are the only subjects
of Commission authority over which the Legislature has retained direct control. Section 25 gives the Commission
discretion to designate certain specified activities as being of
state-wide significance. 6 ' Other activities may be recommended to the Legislature as being of state-wide
significance,' 9 but planning goals for those activities are not
effective until the Legislative Assembly approves their inclusion as activities of state-wide significance.' 70 The same
legislative approval is required for the designation of areas
of critical state concern.' 7 ' The Commission has the authority to articulate and implement statewide planning goals and
guidelines with which those pursuing activities of state-wide
significance must comply.' 2 Non-compliance will result in
the denial of a permit to proceed with the activity.'73 The
planning goals and guidelines for activities of state-wide
significance and for areas of critical state concern are effective upon their approval by the Commission as are the goals
and guidelines for local and regional planning.'74
The importance of planning goals and guidelines is immense for local planning agencies. Section 18 of the Act
makes it mandatory that each city and county adopt a comprehensive plan.' 5 Failure to comply with the goals and
guidelines will result in the refusal by the Commission to approve the local plan. Prior to 1977, if the local planning agency failed to come up with a complying plan, the Commission
was authorized to prescribe, amend and administer a plan for
the local areas.'16 Although the Section authorizing the
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040(2)(b) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.405(2) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.400(1) (1977).
OR. REv. STAT. § 197.405(1) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.405(1) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.405(1) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.415 (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.415(1) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.255 11977). OR. REV. STAT. § 197.230(2)(a) appears to require issuance of goals and guidelines for areas of state-wide significance.
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.255 (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.325 (1977).
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LCDC to plan for non-complying cities and counties was
repealed in 1977,177 the substituted grant of LCDC enforcement powers may give the Commission effectively the same
degree of control. 7 Specifically the LCDC may issue compliance orders1 7 1 and may seek judicial enforcement of those
orders.180 More significantly, the LCDC is authorized to prohibit local land use actions determined by the Commission to
be contrary to the public interest during the interim period
of local non-compliance with comprehensive planning requirements.' 8 Thus, although the LCDC can no longer propose local plans, it can regulate local land use activity during
the period of local non-compliance. The effect of these provisions is that everybody has to plan, they have to do it in accordance with the LCDC's goals and guidelines, and if they
fail to do it or do it incorrectly, LCDC will do it for them.
The LCDC is required to "prepare, collect, provide or
cause to be prepared, collected or provided land use inventories,' 8 2 a task which would seem to be preliminary to the
formulation of any planning goals or the review of any comprehensive plans. No such state-wide inventory of land uses
exists, and that would seem to be only a part of what is needed if the LCDC is to intelligently allocate the state's land
resources. An inventory of all of the state's land based
resources and related activities is essential to comprehensive
planning. An inventory of what the people of Oregon want
and how much they are willing to pay for what they want is
necessary. How is it possible to establish planning goals
without some knowledge of what people want and what is
possible? How is it possible to review the adequacy of a local
comprehensive plan without knowing what the local
resources are and what the local land uses are? It is an obvious principle of decision-making that the quality of a decision can be no better than the quality of the information
available to the decision maker. Information about available
resources and human values are essential to resource planning decisions which are designed to optimize the public interest.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

OREGON LAWS,
OR. REV. STAT.
OR. REV. STAT.
OR. REV. STAT.
OR. REV. STAT.
OR. REV. STAT.

Chapt. 664, § 42 (1977).
§ 197.320 (1977).
§ 197.320(1) (1977).
§ 197.320(5) (1977).
§ 197.320(4) (1977).
§ 197.040(2)(c) (1977).
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The review of local comprehensive plans is the principle
source of LCDC controls over local planning efforts. 8 3 The
extent of this power cannot be fully comprehended without
first recognizing the nature of the processes of legal rule interpretation. Any decision-maker, or interpreter of legal
language, will have increasing discretion in direct relation to
the increasing vagueness of the language being
interpreted.'8 4 A specific provision using precise language
leaves little room for varying interpretations. A vague provision leaves considerable doubt as to intended meaning and
hence much discretion in the authorized interpreter of the
provision. In the case of the application of the state-wide
planning goals and guidelines to local comprehensive plans,
the goals are necessarily vague, as demonstrated above,
since they must accommodate the interests of the entire
state, and the LCDC will, therefore, have vast discretion in
determining compliance. The matter is further removed from
any external control by the fact that the LCDC is both articulator of the vague goals and guidelines and interpreter of
their meaning. The LCDC is both legislator and adjudicator.
The LCDC is required to coordinate planning efforts of state
agencies and all state avenues are required to conform their
actions to the statewide goals and guidelines.' 8 5 In addition,
all state agencies must get approval from the LCDC prior to
taking action affecting an activity of state-wide
significance. 18 6 The effect of LCDC review of mission agency
actions will likely turn-on the bias of the membership of the
Commission as well as the ability of the agency to bring influence to bear on the Commission. In addition, most mission agencies are structured in a way intended to bring particular social influences to bear on agency actions, and the effect of a superimposed review by the LCDC on the agency's
mission is probably unknown, and certainly unanticipated.'8 7
The Commission is required to "insure widespread
88
citizen involvement and input in all phases of the process."
Pursuant to this authority the Commission is required to ap183.
184.
185,
186.

Oa. REv. STAT. § 197.300 to 197.315 (1977).
See, Curtis, supra note 12.
OR. REv. STAT. § 197.040(2)(f) 11977).
OR. REv. STAT. § 197.410(1) (1977).

187.

At least it is clear that the act does not anticipate the problem of LCDC review caus.
ing redirection of mission agency procedures and goals.
O. REv. STAT. § 197.040(2)(g) (1977).

188.
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point a State Citizen Involvement Advisory Committee." 9
The Committee is to represent the geographic areas of the
state and the interests relating to land uses and land use
decisions. The function of this advisory committee appears
to be to advise the LCDC on procedural systems for the involvement of citizens in LCDC decisions. If that is the Committee's function, its membership is unrelated. Given this
function, its membership should be composed of individuals
having expertise in effective citizen involvement. Even if
such a membership could be appointed, they would still be at
a loss to offer advice since the purpose of the desired citizen
involvement is never stated in the Act.
Goal number one promulgated by the LCDC is "to
develop a citizen involvement program that insures the opportunity for citizens to be involved in all phases of the planning process." 19 0 The implementation of this goal is to be
achieved by allowing citizens to be involved in every stage of
the process from data collection to final plan adoption. In addition to opportunities for active citizen involvement, the
guidelines require agencies and public officials to provide
feedback in various ways. The system suspiciously appears
to have the effect of involving citizens, for the sake of involvement, rather than for the purpose of benefiting the
planning process. The citizen involvement provisions of both
the statute and the goals and guidelines evidence no theory
about how citizens can contribute to the planning process.
There is no indication that anyone has considered such basic
questions as to what kind of information citizens of various
backgrounds have the capacity to provide or what kind of
citizen supplied information will be relevant to the land use
planning process. Finally, the LCDC goals and guidelines
repeat the theoretical error of the statute by providing for
the citizen involvement advisory committees without any requirement that those serving on the committees have any
expertise in citizen involvement.191
189.
190.
191.

OR. REV. STAT. § 197.160 J1977).
Oregon Land Use Handbook, supra note 151 at 3.
In fact there are very few individuals with expertise in the process of citizen involvement. It is likely that those appointed to the committees will be individuals who
have been actively involved in other citizen participation activities. Such people will
probably understand how to gain access to existing public decision-making systems
and what aspects of existing systems make access difficult. But that knowledge will
contribute little to the design of citizen involvement procedures which will optimize
citizen contribution to public decision-making. It must be remembered that optimum citizen involvement is not the same thing as maximum citizen involvement.
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If the purpose of citizen involvement is to assist the

state and local planners in identifying people's desires, a different procedure is probably required then for citizen involvement which has the purpose of placating negative
responses to planning decisions, or for citizen involvement
which has the purpose of providing information about existing land uses and resources. Because nobody knows very
much about the processes or effects of citizen involvement,' 92
and because even the allocation of access to government
decision makers is a political issue,'93 the effect of the State
Citizen Involvement Advisory Committee will probably depend upon the constituency of that Committee and the interests that the members represent. 194
Finally, the LCDC is required to prepare "model zoning,
subdivision and other ordinances and regulations" for state
agencies, cities, counties and special districts.1 91 The influence of this power on the substance of local planning is
likely to be very great. Because of the inherent vagaries of
the state-wide planning goals and guidelines, local planning
units and state agencies will find it difficult to draft rules
and regulations which they can be relatively sure will be
found to comply. The only way in which they can be absolutely certain that their planning efforts and the implementation of their plans will be found to be in compliance
is to adopt the Commission's recommended ordinances and
regulations. Because the costs of ordinance and regulation
adoption are high, particularly in view of the required citizen
involvement, the incentives for local and state agencies to
adopt the Commission's model rules will be high. The Commission will thereby have a tremendous influence on the content and implementation of what are supposed to be local
and mission agency programs.
192.

193.

194.
195.

Very little study has been done to empirically measure the effect of various citizen
involvement procedures on government decision making. An example of what has
been done is EBBIN, CITIZEN GROUPS AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY
(1974).
"Asymmetrical access to government - to lawyers and lobbyists and therefore to
courts, legislatures and executives - tends to produce asymmetrical definitions and
distributions of rights, of economic security, and of opportunity sets. In short,
asymmetrical access to law leads to unequal economic performance." Samuels,
supra note 31, at 128. A legal system which tolerates this asymmetry invites competition for a bigger piece of the legal access pie.
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.160(1) (19771 recognizes the political nature of citizen involvement procedure allocation by requiring committee membership to be diverse with
respect to geography and land use interests.
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040(5) (1977).
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As indicated in the preceding discussion of the powers
of the LCDC, the possibility for a significant loss of local
control over the planning process is great. Whether or not
local control is to be preferred to state control is a question
which can only be answered in the context of the goals which
the planning process is intended to achieve. If energy efficiency is the goal of planning, it may well be that a statewide energy accounting system will be more effective than a
multitude of local accounting systems.1 96 However, if the
goal of planning is to optimize social welfare as measured by
individual welfare, planning is increasingly less likely to
achieve its goals the further it is removed from the individuals whose costs and benefits are the critical measure of
success.
Senate Bill 100 allows for even further removal of planning control from the individuals affected by authorizing the
Commission to perform the functions of the State in any interstate planning compacts which may be formed in the
future.1 97 It further allows the LCDC to negotiate with the
interstate agency in defining the respective areas of responsibility for the Commission and the interstate planning agency. 9 " The effect of this provision would seem to be that
LCDC could abdicate its planning responsibilities to the interstate agency, thus further removing control from the people of Oregon who will be affected.
Section 19 of the Act also makes it possible to remove
planning decisions from cities under specified conditions.' 9 9
If cities and counties representing 51% of the population in
any area of the state petition the LCDC for an election, a
regional planning agency will be formed upon a majority
vote of the population of the area 00° Henceforth, resolutions
adopted by the regional planning agency, pursuant to the exercise of county responsibilities to coordinate all planning activities, will be binding upon every city within the region so
long as the county in which the city is located supports the
196.

197.
198.
199.
200.

The preliminaries of any energy accounting capability were developed during the administration of former Oregon Governor Tom McCall. See, Office of Energy
Research and Planning,Office of the Governor,State of Oregon, ENERGY STUDY, INTERIM REPORT (July 26, 1974).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.050 (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.050 (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.190 (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.190(3) (1977).
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resolution.210 The result of this arrangement is that a city
having the minority population of a county may be forced
against its will to cooperate with the coordination efforts of
the regional agency. Although this may not be a bad result
in the abstract, the test of the law's effect must be in relation
to the law's purpose. If that purpose is optimum public
welfare, the discussion in the first two sections of this article suggest that loss of local control may diminish the
chances of achieving the good.
The provisions relating to citizen involvement further
demonstrate that the law is ill-adapted to the achievement of
its stated and apparent purposes. As indicated above, state
and local citizen's advisory committees are supposed to
counsel the LCDC and local planners as to the adequacy of
their citizen involvement procedures. The Act gives these
advisory committees no hint as to what the standards of adequacy should be. Perhaps the real purpose of requiring
citizen involvement is revealed by Section 37 which requires
that public hearings be held prior to approval of the statewide goals and guidelines by the LCDC. The Commission is
to "Consider the recommendations and comments received
from the public hearings... [and] make any revisions in the
proposed state-wide planning goals and guidelines that it
considers necessary ..."202 Is it the citizen or the Commission which is to determine what is best for the citizen?
IV.

JudicialApplication of the New Rules
of the Land Use Game

Three decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court are particularly pertinent to an understanding of how statewide
land use planning is actually working in Oregon." 3 Fasano,
although it predates the implementation of Senate Bill 100,
is the central case in most litigation subsequent to the adoption of Senate Bill 100 because of its procedural requirements for effecting zone changes and the implications
those requirements have in terms of the significance and
201.
202.
203.

OR. REV. STAT. § 197.1904) (1977).
Oa. REV. STAT. § 197.240(2) (1977).
Fasano v. Washington County. 246 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Peterson v. Mayor
and Council of The City of Klamath Falls, 279 Ore. 249, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977); South
of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Commissioners of Clackamas Countv. 280 Ore. 3. - P.2d - (1977). The Fasanoholding was extended to cities in
Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 271 Ore. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

55

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 1
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

nature of comprehensive plans. Peterson"4 and Sunnyside °5
are the important cases in terms of the actual interpretation
of LCDC authority under Senate Bill 100.
Having read the text of Senate Bill 100 and the statutes
which it amended, one would anticipate that an early issue
which the courts would have to face is that of defining what
constitutes a comprehensive plan.2 0 6 Indeed, Fasano involved that very issue. The court's solution was a simple
one, it ignored the issue entirely.
Fasano ipvolved a challenge by a resident of a singlefamily neighborhood to a county decision to grant a zone
change which would allow the location of a trailer park in the
single family neighborhood." 7 The Court upheld the
challenge and overturned the zone change. 0 8 It was assumed, apparently, that a comprehensive plan is one of those
things you know when you see. There is no indication in postFasano decisions that the provisions of Senate Bill 100
relative to the definition of a comprehensive plan do
anything to change the legal significance of the term. °9 It
was undefined before adoption of Senate Bill 100 and its
definition in Section 3 of the 1973 Act is apparently taken to
be the same as it was before the Act. In Fasano the
Washington County Plan was a comprehensive plan because
the county called it a comprehensive plan. 10
From the point of view of the individual, and therefore
from the point of view of an efficient private allocative
system, the definition of comprehensive plan is certainly important given the role which Fasano assigns to the comprehensive plan. The plan has the effect of being a source of
the definition of private property rights and this point cannot be overemphasized.
204.
205.
206.

207.
208.
209.
210.

Peterson, supra note 203.
Sunnyside, supra note 203.
The Supreme Court decision in Green v. Hayward, 275 Ore. 693, 552 P.2d 815 (1976)
failed to decide whether Fasano and Baker always apply to "framework" plans
which divide large land areas into relatively few land use designations. The court did
say, however, that although the statute (Senate Bill100) "calls for both a map and a
policy statement, the statute addresses primarily questions of context, leaving the
problem of form to those responsible for the creation and adoption of the plan."
Fasano, supra note 215, at 577.
Id. at 588.
See Coon, "The Initial Characterizationof Land Use Decisions,~ 6 ENV. LAW 121
(1975) for a good discussion and summary of the post-Fasanocases.
Fasano, supra note 215, at 578.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/1

56

Huffman and Plantico: Toward a Theory of Land Use Planning: Lessons from Oregon

1979

LAND USE PLANNING

Fasano holds that a zone change cannot be granted
unless it is shown to comply with the comprehensive plan,211
or alternatively after the plan is amended so that the zone
change will comply.212 Rights of use in a particular piece of
property are thus defined by the comprehensive plan. It may
be argued that private rights are defined by the zoning
regulations rather than the plan, and it is unclear what
private rights are in the absence of any zoning. However,
because all zoning, whether initial or amended, must conform to the comprehensive plans, and because zoning is mandatory, the plan has the effect of being the definer of private
rights in the use of property.213
Now this situation is a real puzzle, because Senate Bill
100 specifically provides that the comprehensive plan shall
be of a "general nature" which means that it does not
"necessarily indicate specific locations of any area, activity
or use. '14 What the private rights holder faces is this: Under
state law his land must be zoned in conformance with the
plan and the zoning cannot be changed unless it complies
with the comprehensive plan. It is a puzzle how a specific
change will be found to be consistent or inconsistent with a
comprehensive plan which says nothing about specific
parcels. The comprehensive plan need not say anything
about a property owner's land, and yet it is the definitive
statement with respect to his rights of use in his land. What
activities can the private rights holder undertake with any
degree of confidence that he is acting within his rights? It
seems very difficult to know.2"5
The comprehensive plan, then, defines private rights,
but by law it does so in as vague language as possible.
211. Id. at 583.
212. Id. at 582-583.
213. See, Fifth Avenue Corporation v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591 (1978), the
petitioners owned 20 acres of land purchased in 1965 when the county zoning for the
parcel allowed construction of a 'district shopping center." In 1973, the county
adopted a new zoning ordinance and a comprehensive plan, both of which prohibited
the construction of the proposed shopping center. The plaintiffs challenged the
validity of the ordinance and plan on several grounds, but the Court's holding made
it clear that independent of the zoning ordinance, the plaintiff's right of use in the
land was strictly limited by the comprehensive plan.
214.

215.

OR. REV. STAT. § 197.015(4) (1977).

A letter to the editor illustrates the problem.
To the Editor: In the people's own corner of The Oregonian of Sept. 7, Susan Clark
relates her difficulties in trying to erect a house on her own land adjacent to the proposed Greenway. The most revealing and interesting information is in the editor's
note at the end of her letter, which shows that the legislation spawned by the
Oregon lawmakers allows the 150-foot reference in the bill to be expanded. In other
words, Susan Clark does not know how much land, if any, she actually owns. Oregonian, Sept. 13, 1976, at B6, Col. 4.
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Because a private allocative system relies upon precise and
exclusive rights definition for its efficient operation,
Oregon's comprehensive plan requirements are likely to
result in an extremely inefficient allocative system. The
terms of the plan are general, yet they function as limitations on subsequent adjudications of rights. The rights adjudicator, in Fasano the county commissioners, thus has
tremendous discretion in determining what legal rights an
individual holds.
This may be precisely the situation which some individuals prefer, and is no doubt motivation for some of the
support for Senate Bill 100. Because the only substantive requirements for the content of the comprehensive plan are
very general statements about it being promotive of the
public interest, the effect is that private rights are defined as
being whatever does not conflict with the public interest, as
the public interest is defined by the local planning authority
and as the local authority is limited by the LCDC's judgment about public interest. Under such a system private
rights lose all constancy, and those in positions of political
influence relative to the planning process acquire significant
control over the use of land to which they have no legal title.
Presumably the public has title to that portion of rights in a
parcel of land which the official declaration of public interest
finds to be best not left in private hands. Nobody knows who
has what rights, and everybody knows that to achieve their
allocative objectives they must gain influence over the
definers of public interest - the definers of changing private
property rights.
A detour into Fasano land will perhaps clarify what
must certainly be very confusing. The, single issue which
Fasano specifically addresses is whether local government
zoning decisions are legislative or judicial acts. 1 , If legislative, they must be granted a presumption of validity. If
judicial, the courts can jump in and scrutinize what the local
government has done in granting or denying the zoning
change.
The Fasanocourt articulates well the traditional distinction between legislative and judicial functions.
216.

Fasano, supra note 203 at 579.
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Ordinances laying down general policies without
regard to a specific piece of property are usually an
exercise of legislative authority, are subject to
limited review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of
authority. On the other hand, a determination of
whether the permissible use of a specific piece of
property should be changed is usually an exercise of
judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an
altogether different test." 7
What the Court fails to consider is where the initial definition of rights falls into this dichotomy. That, it turns out, is
of critical importance given the significance of the comprehensive plan, the result of legislative action.
A different formulation of the distinction might be
useful. Legislative action is of two broad categories. One
category of legislative action, which is of little concern here,
is that which is done pursuant to implementing publicly held
rights. Such things as the building of roads on publicly
owned rights-of-way are of this category. A second category
of legislative action is that which defines or alters private
rights. Initial rights definition, as distinguished from
changes in existing rights definition, are a subject of
unrestrained legislative discretion. Most legislative action
with respect to rights definition has as its purpose the alteration of existing definitions of rights - the redistribution of
rights - and that legislative authority is severely limited by
several constitutional provisions.2 '8 Alterations of property
rights can be accomplished by the legislature only upon compliance with the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment." '
The allocative efficiency of private rights in property is thus
assured by a requirement that the value of all rights held will
not be taken as a result of governmental shifting of property
rights.
Judicial action is that which relates to the adjudication
of rights. By adjudication is meant the determination of the
extent of pre-existing legislatively recognized rights. Courts
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 580-581.
U.S. CONST. amend. v, XIV; OR. CONST. art. 1, §§ 18 and 20.
The limits imposed by the taking clause are something short of absolute. For discussions of taking see Michelman, supra note 63 and Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
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do not alter rights. They merely inquire into the question of
who holds what rights, a question which frequently arises
due to the vagaries of language and the inability of humans
to anticipate all possible future circumstances."' Again
private rights are protected in the American system from
judicial abuse, principally through the operation of the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In the context of Fasano,the Court accurately describes
the adoption of the comprehensive plan as legislative action,
one which serves to define rights. Most rights defined by the
comprehensive plan are the result of a redistribution of preexisting rights, a redistribution which has seldom received
the protection of the taking clause and thus one which probably leads to significant allocative inefficiencies. 2 2'
The Fasano Court also accurately describes the local
zone change process as a judicial process, if one assumes
that the comprehensive plan defines the extent of private
rights and that any zone change consistent with the plan will
not alter any existing property rights.2 22 The zoning board,
under this view of things, is merely determining the extent
of existing rights, a determination which turns on defining
the public interest. The fact that the private rights holder
has no idea of what his specific rights are, and therefore cannot rely on reaping the benefits of his development of land
based resources, is the result not of a misdefinition of the
types of process involved. It is the result of allowing private
rights to be defined by so vague an instrument as a comprehensive plan.
What the courts and legislature have jointly given us is
a system of rights definition and rights adjudication which
has bodies designed to perform the legislative function performing the adjudicatory function which other bodies were
designed to perform. The local governing body is supposed
220.
221.

222.

See Curtis, supra note 142.
Since Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) zoning has been considered a
valid exercise of the police power and therefore not subject to the compensation requirement of the 5th Amendment. It is allocatively inefficient because it results in
an uncompensated redistribution of property rights and because it results in property rights being ill-defined which reduces incentives to develop land resources. he
Oregon Supreme Court specifically addresses the taking issue in Fifth Avenue Corporation v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 608-614 (1978), and holds that the
enactment of a comprehensive plan does not result in a taking.
This theoretical consistency of the Fasanocase is threatened by the Court's recognition of a "STCPA" ("single tract comprehensive plan amendment") in Fifth Avenue
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to be somewhat accomplished at determining the public interest. Because the public interest is critical to rights adjudication under the Oregon planning system, it only makes
sense to have bodies expert in that determination performing the task. The difficulty, as demonstrated above, is that
private rights holders have extremely ill-defined rights, and
the allocative advantages of a private rights system are
thereby diminished or lost.
Land regulation theorists continue to assert that land
use planning is merely a system of limitations on private
rights, limitations necessary to minimize or eliminate the external costs of private actions. It seems that many continue
to believe that we still operate in an allocative system based
largely on private definition of private welfare. The Oregon
system of planning and its associated effects of rights definition should cause us to wonder if in fact we are not opting for
an entirely new allocative alternative - one which substitutes governmental definition of optimum resource allocation for one based on private definition of a socially optimum
allocation of resources.22 When private rights become so
uncertain that an individual is unable to distinguish between
consequences of rights and consequences of public action, it
is doubtful whether a private rights system exists at all.
How have the Oregon Legislature and the Oregon
Supreme Court gotten us into this situation of probable
allocational inefficiency? Why do the people of Oregon and
their leaders seem so anxious to endorse existing land use
regulation

schemes?2

4

Perhaps it is because

we face

numerous allocational problems which demand an immediate solution. Planning on its face is an obvious solution.
But we do not eliminate our problems by simply turning
them green or blue on our comprehensive plan map. Planning is not a panacea. In fact, it is nothing but arbitrary in

223.
224.

Corporation v. Washington County. 282 Or. 591, 616 (1978). These STCPA's are
Tuasi-judicial like zone changes, not legislative like comprehensive plan changes.
he Court appears to have recognized that, in fact, the comprehensive plan is the
rights definer, and an amendment to that plan fits the definition of a quasi-judicial
act. The next step for the Court will be the recognition that the initial adoption of
the plan similarly affects the existing rights of individuals.
This article is really an argument against acquiescing in this apparent trend.
'So far, Oregon has been more foresighted in-developing land use planning legislation and in zoning its coastal areas than has California. But the risk Oregon now
runs is from the efforts of those who want to unwind the clock by repealing SB 100.
Two States, One Issue, Oregonian, Aug. 8, 1976. at F2, Col. 2.
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the absence of standards against which we may judge the
quality of our plan. Once we have articulated those standards, once we have determined what our resource allocation
objectives are, we may well realize that planning is not the
final and perfect system for all resource allocation. Some
perhaps, but probably not all, and our task is to know which
problems can be resolved by which mechanisms. We will
never know that until we define our standards so that we will
know when we have in fact solved some of the problems.
Exemplary of this unthinking commitment to planning
' Sullivan believes that
is the writing of Edward J. Sullivan. 25
there are certain allocational givens which can be safely
carved in a comprehensive plan of stone.226 This Sullivan
argues despite his own recognition of the vague nature of
standards like public need.2"' He expresses the fear that the
public need standard might invite subjective judgment at
the local planning level. Somehow it seems, similar subjectivity does not influence the application of state public need
standards. Sullivan further supports his case of general
public allocation of resources by restating a very common
misperception of the historical development of local government. Sullivan suggests that we might consider reorganizing
local government so that it will facilitate planning on a
regional basis."2 8 He implies that existing county boundaries
reflect the appropriate units for governmental action during
a time long past. If local government boundaries were in fact
promotive of governmental efficiency in 19th century
America, it is largely coincidental. The history of local
governments is a history of unmatched political and
economic struggle.2 9 If efficiency had anything to do with
the result, it was merely political efficiency. Granted that
local units often do not suit the needs of planners, it should
not be assumed that regionalism is to be preferred to altered
localism. In all probability, the institutional solution will
vary with the nature of the particular land use problem.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

The Taking Issue, supra note 4.
The Taking Issue, supra note 4, at 384-88.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 386.
This conclusion is based on extensive research by the author into the development
of local government in territorial Wisconsin. To date the conclusions of that
research have not been reported.
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The Oregon Supreme Court seems guilty of the same unthinking commitment to planning as a panacea. The purpose
of the Fasanoholding is not entirely clear, but a seemingly
sensible explanation is that offered by Jim Coon in his recent
article."' ° The Court, Coon suggests, sought to protect the
comprehensive plan against "improperly exerted private interests." ' Another article in the same symposium concludes that the purpose of Fasano was to eliminate the influence of "financial impropriety and favoritism of a few." 232
The rationale, which is strongly supported by the
Court's own language, 3 is that the planning and zoning process is subject to strong influence by private economic interests, and that rather than suffer that danger it is
preferable to complicate the process a little by calling it
quasi-judicial. By doing that the courts will be able to keep
the "judicial eye ' 2 34 on the local decision makers and thus

assure that the public interest will not be sacrificed. That the
Court should even suggest such a rationale is both presumptuous and obnoxious to a democratic society.
One might first ask what type of private influence is improper. Certainly the paying of bribes to planning officials is
improper, because it is illegal, but the criminal process, not
judicial review of the planning process, is the appropriate
remedy for such improper private influence. What other kind
of private influence does the court consider improper? The
discussion of planning as a political process in Section III of
this article should point up the fallacy of crying wolf when
one private interest prevails over another in a land use decision. The victory and defeat of private interests is what
politics, including planning, is all about.
Those who cry wolf when a "private economic interest"
prevails in the planning process should not expect to get
relief from the courts. They should seek to redesign the planning process so that political power is redistributed in a way
which gives them more power and others less, or they should
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Coon, supra note 209.
Id. at 125.
Triplett and Fasano, Zone Changes in Oregon: Fasanoin Practice,6 ENv. LAW 177,
190 1975).
Fasano, supra note 215.
Coon, supra note 222, at 136.
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seek to acquire more political power in the existing system.
To seek victory in the courts is to appeal to a forum which
has neither the capacity nor the legitimacy to overturn the
political decisions of the planner. Unfortunately, the Fasano
Court saw a wolf and decided to defang it, regardless of the
effect of their decision upon private rights and upon the
allocational problems which got Oregon into land use planning in the first place. Coon is right when he suggests that
this may be judicial legislation, 35 but as with all public actions, only those whose "ox is gored" will complain.
The Fasano court tried to cover its tracks by throwing
in some procedural requirements to make it look like they
were somehow really out to protect private rights, 3 1 or at
least that is what Justice Schwab of the Court of Appeals
conludes. 37 But the procedural requirements do not comport
with the reason for the Fasanodecision. There is no constitutional requirement that a comprehensive plan, or any other
product of public decision making, be granted the protection
of due process. Due process is exclusively a protection of individuals against the government. The idea that it somehow
protects the government from individuals is preposterous.
In truth, it would seem that the Fasano procedural requirements reflect the Court's felt need to maintain the unity of the legal process. Once it is decided to call a process
judicial or quasi-judicial, it is simply mandatory to throw in
some procedural requirements. Losing sight of the purpose
of those procedural requirements is of little concern so long
as the proper legal structure exists. What the Fasano court
has done is not only to create a system of rights definition
which makes private rights depend upon the vague standard
of "public good", but also a system which requires that the
private individual, seeking to determine the extent of his
rights, prove that what he believes to be his rights is in fact
consistent with the public interest.2 3 There is perhaps no
greater disincentive to productive private action than this.
In July of 1977, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Peterson
v. Klamath Falls, decided that a city annexation was a decision within the planning and zoning responsibilities of the
235.
236.
237.
238.

Coon, supra note 209, at 123.
Fasano, supra note 203 at 588.
West v. City of Astoria, 524 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Or. App. 1974).
Fasano, supra note 203 at 586. See, Triplett and Fasano, supra note 232 at 182-185.
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city and therefore subject to LCDC review for compliance
with statewide planning goals and guidelines.2 39 Although
the statute was amended in 1977 to specifically include
LCDC review of the annexation of unincorporated territory,
the Court's reasoning in Peterson is important because of its
potentially broad implications.
The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals argument that under Oregon law an annexation has no impact on
the permissible land uses in the annexed territory. 4 As a
technical matter the Court of Appeals was clearly correct,
but as a practical matter there can be little doubt that annexation generally is the result of or the prelude to changed land
use patterns in the annexed territory. Given the broad objective of Senate Bill 100, the 1977 amendment of the LCDC
review provision is a logical legislative decision and may well
have been required by an oversight when the legislation was
originally drafted. However, that cannot justify the Court's
decision which effectively amended the statute, the
legislature's acquiesence in that amendment notwithstanding.
Directly stated, the significance of the Petersondecision
is that it characterized the exercise of "planning and zoning
responsibilities" by cities and counties as including any action which impacts on future land use.
The phrase actually employed in ORS 197.175(1) "planning and zoning responsibilities" - seems to
encompass not only local planning decisions which
relate to immediate land use objectives but also
planning objectives which relate to the
2 4 uses to
which that land will be put in the future. '
The Court's use of the language "planning decision" is clearly included as a broad generic description of actions affecting future land uses rather than a statutory definition of
planning activities. Thus, the Court appears to have opened
the door for lower courts to require that any city or county
action having a prospective impact on land use, which will include a vast range of local actions never before thought to be
239.
240.
241.

Peterson, supra note 203 at 255.
27 Or. App. 225, 227-228, 555 P.2d 801 (1976).
Peterson, supra note 203, at 252-253.
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planning activities, be demonstrated to be consistent with
the statewide goals and guidelines and therefore subject to
LCDC review.
As the Peterson Court points out, Senate Bill 100 gives
LCDC the authority to review "any... ordinance or regulation alleged to be in violation of state-wide planning
goals." 4 2 But this is an after the fact review which places the
burden on the LCDC to prove non-compliance by the local ordinance or regulation. The effect of the Peterson decision is
to shift the burden to the local government to demonstrate
prior to the taking of any action which falls within the broad
category of "planning and zoning responsibilities," that the
contemplated action complies with statewide goals and
guidelines.
Because annexation ordinances relate directly to
the Urbanization Goal, they clearly appear to be
subject to LCDC review under [ORS 197.300(d)]...
Therefore, since LCDC has the authority to review
annexation ordinances for compliance with the urbanization goal, as well as any other applicable
goals, it is only logical to conclude that such ordinances must be enacted in accordance with the applicable planning goals in the first place.243
The reason that the Court places this burden of proof on
the local government relates directly to the Fasanodecision.
As indicated above, Fasano held that local decisions to
change zoning regulations are quasi-judicial and therefore
subject to review by the courts. One effect of this judicial
review power is to require the local government to issue a
statement of findings and reasons with respect to an anticipated decision's compliance with, in this case, the
statewide goals and guidelines. Although Fasano specifically required only that zoning decisions be shown to be consistent with the comprehensive plan, later decisions and logic
support the Court's extension of the Fasano holding to the
much broader requirements of Peterson. Because comprehensive plans must comply with statewide goals and
guidelines, and zoning changes must comply with com242.
243.

Id at 254.
Id at 254-255.
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prehensive plans, it follows that zoning changes and the exercise of all other "planning and zoning responsibilities,"
must comply with statewide goals and guidelines.
In summary, the effect of the Peterson decision may be
to require cities and counties to prepare statements of findings and reasons prior to the enactment of any local ordinance or regulation which may impact on future land use.
Failure to do so may result in a suit for injuctive relief which
the courts will have to grant because "[a] fortiori, there are
no findings and no statement of reasons ... [and therefore]
'
no way to adequately review the decision." 244
Even if such
findings and statements of reasons are prepared by the local
government, the decision will be subject to judicial review.
As the discussion in Part IV of Senate Bill 100 and the goals
and guidelines promulgated by LCDC indicates, the standards for judicial review are extremely vague. Thus, local
governments will suffer from the same uncertainties that
hinder private decision makers.
The Oregon Court defends its Peterson decision with a
concluding statement that "this process will not only
facilitate an orderly review of the city's decision on this
issue, .. . but it should also benefit decision-making process
at the local level."2 ' Although it is admirable that the
Oregon Supreme Court is concerned about the quality of
local decision-making, it is hardly their role to assure its
realization. The costs to local government resulting from
this judicially imposed improvement in local decision making may well exceed the actual value of the benefits. In any
event, that weighing of costs and benefits should be made by
the local government itself.2 4
The other major Oregon decision interpreting Senate
Bill 100 is Sunnyside Neighborhood v. Clackamas County. 247
244.
245.
246.

247.

Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
For the reasons discussed at various points in this article, a decision making process
cannot be evaluated unless there is an articulated standard against which its performance is to be judged. In this case, it seems more likely that local governments will
be more institutionally competent to identify the optimum decision making processes for their particular needs. Centralized constraints, like those implicit in the
Due Process Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments, are acceptable only because
of the widely recognized presumption that the resultant benefits to individuals will
almost always out-weigh the costs to society. That it is not a 100% presumption is
reflected in Supreme Court balancing tests.
Sunnyside. supra note 203.
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In the Court's words, the central problem of the case was the
determination of "the substantive standards or criteria by
which an amendment to the comprehensive plan is to be
tested. ' 248 The Court answers that question in the abstract,
but avoids the difficult problem of specific standard articulation by remanding to the county board for more adequate
findings. Apparently it does not occur to the Court that the
difficulty which local governments have in formulating adequate findings and reasons may be a function of the
vagueness of the standards with which they are supposed to
comply.
As in Peterson the Court's decision turns on the Fasano
holding that zoning change actions are quasi-judicial. Of major importance is that Sunnyside did not involve a zoning
change, rather it involved a change to the comprehensive
plan. It is possible to read the Sunnyside opinion as holding
that only those comprehensive plan changes which are single
parcel specific will be deemed quasi-judicial. The Court's
holding in Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County,
specifically holds that a single tract comprehensive plan
amendment is quasi-judicial. 49 This reading seems particularly appropriate since the County Commission action in
Sunnyside was an apparent attempt to avoid the re2 o The Court's language supports this
quirements of Fasano.
interpretation by appealing to the Fasano rationale about
the need to have the public interest and not private interests
control land use decisions.
However, there are difficulties with this interpretation.
Senate Bill 100 specifically provides that the comprehensive
plan "does not necessarily indicate specific locations of any
area, activity or use.""' Given that the plan need not inform
a rights holder of the permissible use on his specific property, and therefore use changes on specific parcels are possible
without conflicting with the plan, it is difficult to understand
248
249.
250.

251.

Id at 10.
282 Or. 591, 618 (1978).
Fasano requires: It must be proved that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive plan.
"In proving that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive plan in
this case, the proof, at a minimum, should show (1) there is a public need for a change
of the kind in question, and (2) that need will be best served by changing the
classification of the particular piece of property in question as compared with other
available property."
OR. REV. STAT. 197.015(4) (1977).
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what is different about a use change which, by the accident
of lines drawn bv the planner, requires a formal change in the
plan.
It must be admitted, however, that the Sunnyside
holding is probably logically consistent with the Fasanoline
of cases. Thus, Sunnyside, which has the effect of
significantly widening the judicial intervention into a clearly
legislative area, serves to magnify the problems created by
the initial holding in Fasano.The next logical step will be to
hold that any comprehensive plan change proceeding is a
quasi-judicial process; all of this because the Court in Fasano
held that zone changes which serve to define private rights
are quasi-judicial and therefore subject to judicial review.
That fundamental holding was as it should have been, but
the important line between judicial and legislative authority
was obliterated by the Fasano interpretation of Senate Bill
100. That interpretation had the effect of making those
private rights a function of the vague language of Senate Bill
100 and of the LCDC goals. By this process of reasoning the
Oregon Court is set to invade the legislative domain
whenever the standards set forth by the legislature have the
effect of helping to define a private right. Most legislative
enactments will fall into that category.
It is not clear whether the court or the legislature have
created this problem. The legislature wrote the vague standards and set up a process for judicial review. The courts
have had difficulty reviewing the local decisions in view of
the vague standards and have thus remanded for better findings and reasons. It is unlikely that an honest court will
often declare the finding to be adequate given these vague
standards, causing most cases to end in a remand. With the
burden on the local government to justify the zone or plan
change against these vague standards, changes will be infrequent, thus perpetuating the political choices of the original
drafters of the plan. The Court has complicated the situation, however, by its willingness to mount a white horse and
charge forward in defense of the public interest against the
evil foes of private interests. It is a noble but blind pursuit
absent a clearer understanding of the complex relationship
between public and private interests.
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The Court's willingness to offer itself as the ultimate
decider of the public interest is re-emphasized in Peterson.
The Court of Appeals had held that the Fasano standards of
review had no application independent of the context of the
Fasano decision. But the Supreme Court held that it had the
power to review the proposed plan change to assure that
(1) there is a public need for a change of the kind in
question, and (2) that need will be best served by
changing the classification of the particular piece of
property in question as compared with other
available property.2
The only available standards for the Court to use in answering these questions are those set forth in Senate Bill 100 and
the LCDC goals. As the discussion of those standards indicates, they essentially require that the public interest be
optimized. Thus, the Court must appeal to its own determination of the public interest.
A November, 1978 decision of the Oregon Supreme
Court opens the door wide for judicial intervention while
leaving local and state planners with almost unlimited
discretion to alter the expectations of private property
owners. In Anderson v. Peden,2 5 1 the Court upheld the
denial of a conditional use permit. The permit was denied,
among other reasons, because the petitioner failed to prove
that the requested use was "an encouragement of the most
appropriate use of land" and would "promote orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban use. ' 2,2b The Court
itself recognized that the former standard is "undeniably
vague," but held that the petitioner could still be held to that
standard of proof. Ignoring the constitutional issues raised
by the case, it is at least clear that any efficiency benefits of
a private right system will be lost when rights are based on a
standard so uncertain.
Although the case came to the courts as a result of the
Fasano standard, the Court has totally lost sight of the only
reasonable foundations for judicial review. In Fasano the
Court described the planning process as quasi-judicial
252. Fasano, supra note 203, at 584.
252a. 78 OR. Aiv. Sii E-s 313 (1978).
252b. Id. at 319.
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because private rights are at stake. In Anderson, while
carrying out the very judicial review justified by Fasano,the
Court finds that the petitioner has no constitutional claim
unless it be based upon unequal treatment as compared to
other property holders similarly situated. There are no
longer any rights in private property which are protected by
the taking clause or the due process clause. The only constitutional protection for the property holder, whose interests justified judicial review in the first place, is that if
the state takes or alters private property rights, it must do
so to all in an equal manner.
The judicial rules of the land use game in Oregon are not
complicated in practice. Advocates should be able to understand how they must proceed. The problems with the Oregon
Supreme Court's land use holdings are much more basic.
They relate to the underlying principles of public decision
n~aking in any form, and to that extent the problems created
by the courts are no different than those created by the
legislature.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is incumbent on those who criticize existing laws and
institutions to at least suggest alternatives. Although we
are unable to offer any specific formula for the immediate,
practical implementation of an improved land use planning
system, the concluding paragraphs of this article will outline
some of the things which must be understood before meaningful alternatives can be developed. But first a brief review
of what has been discussed above.
Land allocation decisions in the United States have
traditionally been made by private individuals and through
private transactions. As the theoretical discussion of Part
II points out, the basic justification for land use regulation
or government intervention in any form, is based upon the
alleged failure of the market place to internalize many of the
costs associated with private transactions. It has been
assumed throughout this article that significant external
costs in fact result from private decision making with
respect to land use. Therefore, the appropriateness of some
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form of public intervention has been generally assumed. The
problem, of course, is to identify the optimal form of intervention.
The criticism in Parts III and VI of the form of intervention adopted by Oregon's statewide land use planning
system is based largely on theoretical considerations. The
critique might best be viewed as a set of hypotheses which
awaits empirical evaluation. The accuracy of the hypotheses
can only be determined by empirical studies which have not
been done or by theoretical challenges to the arguments
which are the foundation for the ciriticism of the Oregon
system. The authors are not aware of any theoretically
sound justification for the Oregon system, nor is there any
evidence that Oregonians as a whole are any better off as a
result of statewide land use planning under Senate Bill 100.
Accepting that significant external costs result from
private land use decision making does not, of course, inevitably lead to the conclusion that government intervention
in some form is warranted. 53 It may well be the case that the
costs of a particular government intervention exceed the
benefits which derive from the intervention in the form of
lessened external costs. It may also be the case that government intervention will result in new social costs due to the
fact that individuals may no longer be faced with important
incentives to undertake private actions which minimize external costs. But this article is based upon an assumption
that there are circumstances where government intervention
in land use decision making will improve the welfare of society as a whole. Therefore, the problem is to design a land use
regulation system which will improve the efficiency of land
allocation.
The Oregon system is found wanting because it merely
shifts many land use decisions from private rights holders to
public officials without any means of assuring that the
public choices will in fact result in internalized costs and
more efficient land use. Although no fail-safe system is pro253.

The subject of external costs is discussed in Part II. It should be added, however,
the identification of external costs is a very difficult problem. Hence, the broad
assumption that these costs exist is underlain by an assumption that we can or will
be able to identify existing external costs.
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posed here, there are a few general guidelines which should
be followed in the development of alternative land use planning systems.
First, it is important to bear in mind that social welfare
is not something which can be defined in the abstract, nor
can good land use planning be defined objectively. Social
welfare is a direct function of individual welfare and can
therefore only be defined in terms of combined subjective
value choices. This nature of social welfare leads to some fundamental conclusions about the role of the public officials involved in land use planning.
At a minimum it is clear that land use planners cannot
be, as many of them claim to be, experts at good land use.
Good land use for some communities, may be poor land use
for others. Those planners who claim to know how land can
best be used are either fooling themselves or covering for imposing their own values by appealing to abstract principles
of good land use. The risks of granting such power to any individuals are potentially serious.25
The role of the land use planner must be that of a collector of information about individual values and impacts on
values of land use alternatives. The land use planning
system must be designed to insure that planners will fill this
dual informational role. Because social welfare is a function
of combined individual welfares, it is impossible to decide in
the public's interest without a measure of what satisfies
those individuals. Citizen involvement schemes are an apparent recognition of this need to measure individual values.
As a view of the Oregon citizen participation systems
reveals, however, there is little in the system which indicates
an understanding of how citizen involvement is supposed to
inform public decisions or what information citizens have
the capacity to provide. 5 Obviously, research is needed
which will lead to a better understanding of how the re254.

255.

In fairness to many land use planners who view their role as that of information
generator, it should be said that the seriousness of this grant of power rests as much
in the potential for abuse as in any evidence of past abuse. Although we may, in fact
presume our public servants to be honest, much in the design ot American political
institutions reflects a hesitancy to let temptation influence those in power.
It is clear that all citizens will not have the same interests, values, needs, or
capacities. Hence their ability and willingness to provide information will vary as
will the information to which they have access.
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quisite information can be efficiently collected from the people in whose behalf the public decision maker purports to
act.
In addition to collecting information on human values,
planners should also be in the business of generating information about the impacts of alternative land uses. This information is only relevant in that it will provide the opportunity for subjective value choices to be made as intelligently as possible.25 6 It is also, therefore, essential that people
who will be impacted by alternative land uses have the best
information available before expressing their value choices.
To the extent that this information is not privately
generated, the land use planner can serve as an information
generator and disseminator. It is imperative of course, that
this publicly produced information be objectively
disseminated and that it not be produced when the costs of
generation and dissemination exceed the benefits from more
informed value choices.
To state the central point succinctly, the land use planner should have two distinct functions. First, he should supply data about the costs and benefits of alternative land
uses. Second, he should poll by some means the impacted
members of society to determine what alternative will be
socially optimal. The latter function is strictly empirical,
although methodologically complex. The design of the
methodology will depend initially upon a decision about how
the values of the various members of society should be
weighted to result in a socially optimum allocation of land.
This article has urged the adoption of a weighting system
which approximates that which would result in an ideal
private market. Such a system may have to be adjusted to
accommodate certain distributional objectives. Whatever
theory of social optimization is adopted, it must precede the
formulation of a methodology for subjective value measurement. A planning system, like that employed in Oregon,
which totally lacks a theoretical foundation can at best lead
to random results. Random public decision making is unlikely to improve on a private decision making process which has
a well developed theory to support its results.
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There may be, as Barry Commoner has often argued, an ecological minimum. It is
certainly persuasive to argue that at least that minimum should be imposed. It is
also arguable that, given total information, everyone would choose to do nothing
which exceeded that minimum and therefore public imposition of the minimum
would be consistent with private choice.
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